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SYOEELESS POWDER. 
1s considering the effect of the use of smokclcss pode l .  on the 
tactics of the futurc, tlicro is ao war experience to guide US, and, beyond 
tlic effects noted at tlic manceiirrcs of some Ihropean ariiiies, there 
is little to assist our rcscarchcs cxccpt the imagination. The im- 
pressions of thosc prcscut a t  the Contincntnl mniimurrcs arc thcrc- 
fore extrcmcly important, cspccinlly ns it sccnis iilorc cnsy to rcalize 
tlic cffcct of srnokcless powdcr in wnr from xiicrp nianmuvres in pcnce 
tlinu that t o  be produced by magazine rillcs :iiid machine-guns, the  
irason bcing that in the latter case, tlic highly strung state of men’s 
xierrcs in battle mid ‘its cffcct on pliooting is a factor iuipossiblc to 
t:ikc. n corrcct cstim:ite of wlien no bullcts are flying about. M’c 
tliereforc cannot do bctter than quote a few- iniprcssions of those wlio 
took part in, o r  were present n t ,  the Gemi:m and French uianauvres 
of 16SO mid 1690. 
bnpressions gniizcd at recent Xmtmrco.es.-Of t1)c Gcrrian 
inanmuvrcs of lSS9, wllcn two corps opposed cacli otller, tho OILO with 
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TlIE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 607 
blAck and thc otlicr with SniOkC~Css powdcr, IC Gcrrnen officcrl writes 
R8 follow : “ Tlic ponder bcing nearly frco from smoke, allocvcd the 
lllnr~siiien to tnku bottcr aim tliair was possiblc with tlic old poivder, 
cspccialIy in damp ntmosphcrc without wind, wlicn tlic smokc lay 011 
tlic around nnd formed nlmost nn opnquc \\-all bctwccn tliu marlismnil 
and his objcct. A better aim, casicr judging distnilcc, quicker firing 
siilclcn :ippcnrialicc of lnrgo objccts, as for instance, supI)oi.ts, 
mlunins, ndvnncing bnttcries, c a d r j - ,  ctc. . . . . nII this 
cr:Is facilitated by the use of sniokelcss po\\-dcr.” 
011 tlic sninc subject Jlr. G. Snundcrs3 says:- 
11 Sniiiniing np thc rcsults of tlic day ns :iffcctcrl by tI1o list of 
smokeless powdcr, it csercised n most dcmoralizin~ and bcmildcr- 
iiig effcct upon tlic troops cxposed to infnntry fire. Pnrthcr (1.) TIic 
cneiny (iisiiig black powder) cspcricnccd cxtraordinnrj- difficulty in 
determining (u) tlic distance, ( t )  the direction ~ h c n c c  tho fire came. 
(2.) The sniokelcss powdcr g a ~  tllc hr i i ig  Corps which uscd i t  n. 
grc:ltly iiicrcnscd ccrtninty of aim nrising from tho absciico of srnokp 
froin tlicir own fire. Thi3 was cspccinlly :isscrtcd in tliu of the 
artillery. It \vas frccly s tdcd that 011 this nccouiit tlic :irtiIlcrj- \vcrc 
able to firc twicc as many ronrids ns in tho sanic pwiod with tllo 01~1 
 pod.^. (3.) \\'hen thc infantry \\-as firing, browi smokc wns fnintly 
Tisiblo froni tlic flanks ; facing tlicir fire, 110 smoke or ncst to none 
could Lc pcrccivcd. On tlic 20th aud 2Ist .  Scptcmber a r t i ~ ~ c r y  
Oniccrs \vcrc frccly dcclnring tliat tho i i c ~  p o ~ ~ i l c r  wciglicd jinlf as 
iniich ns the old, thus cnabling doublc tlic quantitr (of b!ank) to 
transported.” 
(deptcinbcr 16th) n t  
thc Frcncli mnntxluwcs of 1890 confirms d i n t  wns obscrved 19- 
JIr. Snundcrs as to tlic invisibility of srnokc of infantry fire frorn tlic 
front nt distniiccs bcyond 50 jnrds. A Gcrrnnii officcr writing in the 
“Militiir Wochenblntt s a p  : “Our rcgnlntions, both for file nncl 
drill, I i n m  now Inid it. down tlint nll coiisidcntioiis ns regnrcls co\-cI* 
must Lo subordinated to fire cfl’cct. SO tliat now it can no longer bo 
urgcd, in opposition to smokclcss ~ioivdcr, tlint it  fails in giving goor1 
coi-er to tlic firing liiic in tlic way thr? smoke of tlic black poir-dcl. 
did. h i  firc nntioii now, in nccordniicc with tlic principle quoted, 
tIic nicn niust think liow Iicst they can gct tlic fullest fire cifcct ant1 
uot 1iow tlicy ~iiay most sccurclj- find slicltcr; . . . . . . . . 
if one side can colnluniitl tlic scrviccs O f  sriiokcIcss ponder it will see 
hctter, aim better, c n i ~ y  out its fire discipliiic inore pcrfcctly, nii(1, 
fnnlly, produce R grcatcr firc clfcct.” 
CetzeraL CotisiJe,aliol,d.-Hclicc tllc si ipiorit j-  of s~~iokcIess p05vd~!i*, 
which will cnusc nII iintims to n h p t  it. Tlic nrniing of troops iritI1 
magzinc rifles :ind tlic introductioli of macliinc-guns inakcs its 
atloption still. morc necessnry: for 110\v nrc i i i ~ i i  to fire i:ipidIy :L 
iiingfiziiie full of cnrtiidges with anTtliiiig nppr0:icliiiig nccurncy whc.11 
1 >[njor Ropl in  voii nichrrrtciri, “ Colburil’s U.S. Ihg..” Fcbruw!, 1830. 
2 11 TIIC Li,t Gcrniiii 3l:uiwiim?s.” Imturr. nt I:.U.S. Iiiditnlioii, 13111 J I I I  c, 
3 ‘1 I:.s.I. J O U : I ~ , ”  Sorcinbcr, 1SS9. ( T r n i i ~ l : ~ t d  by C:iptniri 3rclr.) 
Tlic iiiilitniy corrcspondcnt of tho “ Times 
Isno.--‘ Xorrkig I’oit,” I(ith Juue.) 
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39s TIIE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 
at the first shot tlicir front is obscurcd with smokc w-liicli increases at 
eRch dischnrgo ? What sportsman, sliooting with black powder, hao 
not erpcricncecl tlic mortification of bciiig nn~blc to put in his secolld 
barrel owing to tlie smoke caused by t5c first ? 
On tlic other liand, tlic ciirtain of smoke gavc a certain amonrlt of 
confidencc to thc firing linc, wliicli apporciitly felt a sort of sccilrity 
(of tlie ostrich dcscription) Icliind it, a i d  tlic smoke hid e0lllq 
qliastly sights from tho mcn’s-rkw m-hich will now bc more visible. 
l h c  moral and invigorating cffcct on thc soldicy of firing off I l i R  
weapon nix1 producing a cloud of smokc was considcrablc, mid ninny 
arc tho instauccs qnotcd in rcccnt wars of nicn shooting to keep up 
their courage. It seems likcly tho noisc and smoke had a great d& 
to do with this. Thc iioiso (slightly decrcscd) remains, but the 
smoke has gonc, and tlic opposing lincs will bc nblc at decisive 
ranges to sec cncli othcr fncc to fncc. 
Smokeless l’ozcder xot Xoiseless.--Foi. somo tirnc thcrc csistcd a 
gencral idea that smokclcss p o ~ d c r  would bc mom or lcss noiscIcss, 
and still furtlicr complicate tlic prooblcm of its effect on thc tactics of 
the future. nut tliosc who linvu Iicard i t  know that this is nn  error, 
and wc may tnlic Sir F. Abcl’s’ word for it, that such ,z powder is not 
likcly to troublc us during tlic prcscnt gcncration. 
Having, so to speak, prcpniwl tlic way for thinking out tho effect 
of smokclcss pow.de~-, tho rnrions opcrntions of war as nffcctcd by this 
new elcnicrit will now be csnmincd. 
Zflecfs of Sniokc.-Tho effect of smoke is that i t  liidcs cvcr~thing, 
and oncc in tho tliick of tlie figlit practically notliiiig is sccn. 
Rcmovc thc smoke, and tlic cncmy is csposcd to Tiew if within de- 
cisive rango ; if not, then tlic ground mlierc Iic is is likcly to bo secn. 
Combatants may be diridcd into two catcgorics- 
(1.) Bodies of skirmishers, batteries in action, and all units in tlic 
act of firing arc inconvcnicnccd by their own smoke. 
(2.) Bodies such as columi~s of supports, rcscrvcs, batteries in 
motion and cavnlrr, and a11 troops ~vliich arc not firing bcncfit by 
smoke, but in tho way of cover only. 
. But it is acknowledged now that all considcrations of cowl* must 
yield to tliosc which favour cfIicncj- offirc. In  short, ns Captain hlocli? 
puts it: I‘ To sce is of tlic first importance in battle, and, aftcr that, 
not to bo sccn.” If unablc to scc, riot only arc men unablc to firc 
propcrlly, bu t  owing to tlic unccrtninties conscqucnt on riot bciug 
able to see, tlicy arc mucli more linblc to suddcii panic. Liko i n ~ i i  
iu the dark tliej conjure up dangers wliicli do not csist. 
Ittfanfry v. h j a n t r y .  
IIowcvcr perfcct may be tlic fir0 discipliiio of infantry, its firc 
effect dcpcnds morc on cacli individual soldier tliari is thc case 
with artillcrj-. Tliis mist  n l r r r ip  rcmniii true, siucc nrtillcrj- Oficrrs 
: I‘ Engiucering,” 7th E’cbruq,  1690. 
La pouclrc ,cans fon& c t  13 tictiquc,” “ Hcvuc d’drtillcric,” tomc sxxr. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
5:5
3 2
2 J
un
e 2
01
6 
THE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 390 
haye far fewcr units of firc to deal with, and kavc, ns a rule, to 
exercise thcir control n t  s much grcatcr distancc from tho cncmy. 
AS infantry aclmnccd to tlic attack, tho position of tho 'cticniy w;ts 
<liscIoscd to it by tl!o smoke of his firc; bnt IvIien tho attnckcrs 
opened fire, vcry soon tho cncmfs position was hiddcn from tlicm by 
sn~okc. The cncmy was thus first of d l  sccn niid then not sccn. In  tho 
fature, thc rcvcisc will bo tlic cnsc. Attacking infailtry has to fccl 
way, and, pcrliaps, on arriving within 400 or 500 y-nrds, it will sco 
60 encmy face to facc. IVhcn this t:lkcs place, tlie sidc lvliicli ciln 
develop the grcatcst and most cfficicrit firc will win tllc clay. Ovc1- 
opcn ground, tho attacking linc can adrancc 110 furtllcr uiitil thc fir0 
of tho stationary or dcfcnding troops is almost snbducd, and tho 
intensity of firc ncccssnry to producc that cffcct is so grc:lt tllat 
before the attackcrs ndrancc tlic dcfcndcrs will most piBbably )lava 
retired. Tho orily casc wlicrc that sccxns unlikcly is, wlicn tllo 
groiind in mar of tlic dcfcndcxs is not only wept by fire but is in  
full view of thc attackcrs; as, for instance, when tlieir only lillc of 
rctrcat,Iics up n. stccp slop0 in rear. In this cast nothing will remain 
for tlic dcfcndcrs, wlien cornplctcly cowcd and dcmoidizcd, but to 
suiwndcr. Thero will no longcr bc s scrccn of smokc, uuder coyer of 
which thc rctircnicrit can bc cffcctcd niisccn. On tho othcr Iinnd, 
the supports and rcscr\-cs of thc attcickcrs bcing in future uiiIiiddcl1 
b j  smokc, the task of thc nttnckcrs is niucli morc difficult, and tlicy 
will havo to dcploj- earlier anti makc niorc uso of thc ground as 
covcr. It would sccxri, tlicrcforc, tliiit tlic frontal attack of infnntry 
by infantry, cvcn in rniicli superior forcc, O V C ~  opcn ground, is 
rcndcrcd much mom di5icult tli:Iii formerly (during dajliglit) b j  tIlo 
introduction of srnokclcss powlcr, thc quality of the troops on both 
sidcs bcing cqual. 
Eflccts of Terrain.-Ixi broken or cncloscd country d i c r o  much 
covcr is nrnilnblc tlic casc is diifcrcnt. LIcrc advancing infmtry can 
be concenlcd, and its prcscncc ci-cn is no longer bctraycd by smokc. 
Tlic nttackcrs m a j  thus push forward supcrior numbcre, and, uiilcss 
cousidcixblc physical obstnclcs interrciic, tlicy hnrc great clinnccs 
oi succcss. In such ground the attack and dcfcncc arc placed on 
nioro orcn footing, and tlic abscricc of smokc coricenls tlic strcngth of 
tho attack as IWII as of tlic dcfcncc. Thus, victory will Lcloiig to that 
sidc which is strongest, can shoot best, and in which the control arid 
firc discipline is t l c  most pcrfcct. Probably many C ~ S C S  will arise 
whcrc friendly troops nrc mist:ikcii for those of thc cncmy, foroftcn tho 
direction of tlic puffs of sixiokc shooting out froni thc rifles used to bc 
tlio only guidc for tlic rnomcut as to dietlicr thcj- procccdcd from 
friciids or focs. For thc samc rcnson, local flank attacks will prob- 
ably bcconic morc startliug in tlicir rcsults owing to tlicrc Lcing 
nothing to inclicatc \vlicncc thc sndden showcr of bnllcts procccdcd. 
E&ct on Fire DiscipZine.-As rcprds firc discipliiic and control of 
nicn, tho task of tlic commaiidcr of n unit will bc hcilitntcd by tho 
abscxicc of stnokc, for (1) no longcr blindcd b ~ -  finlokc a t  dccisive 
~auges,  Iic will scc bcttcr whcrc to dircct his aim ; (2) Iic will scc tlic 
wholo of liis unit, nncl conscqucntly cau hold thc men h t t c r  in liaud ; 
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400 THE TACTICAL OPERATIONS OF THE FUTURE. 
(3) Iic will sce the nciglibouring units, and the bcttcr conform to 
tlicir movcincnts ; (4) if killcd hu will bc sccn tp fall, and the second 
in coniniand can at once fakc his place. I n  thcsc particulars the 
:idvnntagcs pcrtain equally to tlic attack and dcfcricc. 
Arlille y v. Arlillery. 
Tlio smoke caused by artillery fire bcing so much tliickcr than that 
of infaritrx, it would nppcar thrd srnokclcss pomdcr will benefit the 
fornicr arm to :I proportionntcly greater csterit. Thcre are also no 
supports axid rcscr'ves in tho casc of artillery to liidc from view by 
sniokc, the lirnbcrs aud w ~ g o n s  bciiig gcncrally conccalcd by the 
ground. 
3Jecf.s of SiizoEe.-Tlic cITccts of smokc on artillcry may bc classed 
as follows:- 
(1.) Smoke intcrfcrcs with the laying, and frcqucnt stoppagcs of 
firc liave to take place to allow ii, to clcnr awny. 
(2.) Smokc discloses the position of every gun to the cncnij-, and 
tlicrcforo assists his ncciiracy of firc. 
(3.) Smoke liidcs thc ininicdintc fisont of tho  linc of guns, and ma1 
thus assist liostilc skirniishcrs to crccp rip unseen. 
On tlic othcr hand, (4) i t  hides movcnicnts from tlic cncmy; and- 
(5.) It rnnkcs his observation of fire in tlic case of long shclls 
mere dif€icult, for the buists bccomc confused with and lost in the 
sniokc of tlic guns. 
Xos. (4) and (5 )  arc cridcntlj not of such importance as tlie rest, 
for, in these dnrs of long inngcs, tlic niovcrncnts of bnttcrics on tlic 
battlefield arc riot so frcqucnt, and thc dificulty of obscrving bursts 
short and orcr is probably grcatci. wlicn thc guns arc jndiciously 
plnccd and no sinokc betinys their position. 
Efect of Absence of Smolx.-!L'lic absciico of smokc, however, will 
probably causc a formcr favouritc innnccunc of artillcry to be dis- 
continued. 
Somctixncs, uiidcr a11 accurate liostilc artillery firc, batteries 
advanccd 100 yards or so undcr corer of tlic veil of smokc, and camc 
again into action without attracting nttcntion, thus causing thc 
cncniy to coiitinuc his firc at tlic original inngc. This will no 
longer bc possiblc. 
With a mass of pins in action, the smoke is so thick, particnlnrly 
on damp still days, that it is :L most dificult mnttcr to 13,- thc gun, 
much 1c.s to o1)serrc tlic fire. Ucncc, cffcctucl conccntixt'ion of firc 
xiiust bc vcry dificult to carry out. Tlic qbscncc of smokc, tlicrc- 
fore, improws fire control and acciiriicy \vIicn laying on defined 
ohjccts. It iiinkcs it  possible to firc inucli more rapidlly, as stntcd 
abovc (p. 397) by German Olficcrs, on account of no check in tlic fire 
1)cing ~ ~ c c e ~ s a r y .  It makes it very casy to niask batteries bcliind 
In~shcs or carcfiilly placcd cpnulmcnts, and thus givcs a much 
1:nrdc.r task to tlic cncmy's guns. A " Tiiiics " 1 telegram from the 
I' Tinice," 26th Aiigiis-t, 15%. 
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TILE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF TIIE FUTURE. 401 
of tlic Italian maumurrcs tliis ycar statcs that bnttcries remained 
in actioii for Iialf nu hour without licing seen. 011 lo\r  gqound this 
n l a ~  often hnppcn, bnt gcnerdly tho crest of a ridge will partially 
&firlo tlicir position. 'J'lic " Tiincs '' corrcspoiidcnt at  thc Frcnch 
manaurrcs ncnr Cambrai' says, " that at 2,500 pids a specinliy 
brilliallt flash Wl.5 0bSCl.Wbk Wit11 tho dalicd cyc, bnt 110 SmOkC. 
\Yith a good glass, Iio\vcvcl; a puff of stnokc, mliicli almost imme- 
&ntcly disappcnrcd, w:ts discernible." Later 2 on, ho\ycvcr, hc 
corrects this by saying that this puff was diist and not smokc. 
1Iciicc dusty ground is a disidmntngc. 
Tlic front of a line of guus \ d l  now bc morc secure, as skirmishers 
drnncing ovcr opcn ground will casily bc seen. l'rincc KinW tells 
how, ct KoniFgratz, whcn thc artillcry \vcrc trying to beat cacli 
other down, tho Austrian guniicrs did not noticc the Prussisii 
skirmislicrs followed by closc columns, advancing agiiiist thcir front 
tlirougli thc coru across an open vnllcj-. 'l'hc result wns tliat most 
of tlic guns n-ere captured. This is not so likcly to hnppcn in futurc, 
liowcvcr absorbed thc gunncrs may bc in tlicir firc, so long as tho 
ground in front is fairly opcn. 
Uy reason of thc smokeless powder cartridgc being little morc than 
half the weiglit of thc old cartridge tlicrc is n sa\-ing of about 1$ Ib. 
to 3 Ibs. pcr imniid iii tho 22-pr., which mc:ins that  iienrly 10 pcr ccnt. 
iiioru rouuds can bc carried, unlcss this saring of weight be uscd to 
pro\-icle brass cartridge cases. 
It is probablc also that tlic absence of smokc may, wlicrc thc 
ground ndmits (as on a frontal s lop )  and wlierc great conecnti-ation 
of firc is desirable, cnablc two tiers of artillery firc to bc brought to 
bear, the inorc forward batteries bcing of conrse out of raugc of 
prcmaturcs from thosc in rcnr. A s  rcg:irds supporting. an infantry 
attack, thc gunners will be bettcr nblc to see tlicir own inhntry ad- 
wncing, mid will not ruu rhc risk of kecping up tho covering fire too 
long and killing tlicir own friends. 
Tho rcsult of all this will bc tliat it will become of grcat im- 
portance to pick out men with good vision, who, with the nssistance 
of ficld glasses, telescopes, and other aids to sight, may bc ablc to 
niako out tlic position of tlic cncmy's battcrics, and observc thc bursts 
of slicll with rcfcrencc to them. As his grins will prescxit no such 
ilcfincd objects to lay 0x1 as fornicrly existed in tlic puff: of smoke, 
tlic f l a s h  being xiiore dcceptirc than smoke, points such as trees, 
houses, or smaller objects, will hare to bc chosen for regulating thc 
firc by, wlicn oricc their rclntivc position to tlic hostile guns is xnado 
out. Thns, lnyers, no longer tcrnptcd to lay on thc smokc, will bo 
more in tlic 1i:inils of thc conimandcr of thc battery, mid will look to 
liiiii to rininc tlic object to firc at. Tlic dilliculty tlic latter will cx- 
1)eriencc in painting out thc ob.ject v d l ,  Iio\~cvci*, bc incrcnscd, and 
citlier hc will have to la? tlic first gun liinisclf and cause tho sub- 
nltcriis to look ovcr tlic sights SO as to  fix the object in thcir minds, 
" Times," 16th September, 1690. 
I: " Times," 22nd Scptcmbcr. 
"7th Letter on Carolry." 
2 E  YOL. ZYXY. 
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401 THE TXCTLCATJ OPERlTIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 
or some sort of indicator may bc uscd which all JSos. 1 can look 0tCr 
bcforc laying thcir guu for thc first time. Uattcrics viill tlicrcfore 
iiot opcn firc in such a liurry RS formcrly, and \-cry much mill dcpclld 
on tlic first shot bcing wcll laid. The niost dnngcrous momcnt for 
artillcry is whcn it comcs into action in full vicw of a11 cncniy already 
in position. Tho sidc which sccs the othcr first will liavc gained :& 
grcat admctagc, ns it can now oftcn opcii firc without accurately 
disclosing its position. Tlicrcfore i t  is most ~~robablc that, except in 
urgcnt cascs, guns will be brought up and iinlimbcrcd undcr C O V C ~ ,  
and tlicii ruii up into position for. tlie last 20 or 30 yards by hand. 
Guns pccring OVCI’ a crest arc not likely to be xioticcti iuilcss range. 
tnkcrs and battcq- commnndcrs paradc about 0 x 1  horscbnck in tllc 
open bcforcliand. Thcrcforo thcir liorscs must bc lcft undcr COTC~. 
Tlie moral cffcct of thc resulting suddcnncss in opcning firc should bc 
very grcat under such circumstnnccs. Thcsc view-s arc supported 
:dso by Captain yon dcr Goltz’ and by Captain 3Iocli.’ 
If tho ground pcrmits of i t  thc rangcs :it which fire will bc opcnc[I 
will incrcasc; for though it is to the intcrcst or’ the assail.mt’to gct 
liis artillcry up to dccisivc range as soon as possiblc, yet tlic dcfcndcr 
will prcvcnt that, i f  he can, by opcriing firc immcdiatcly 110 sccs tile 
:iilvancing cncmy. Thc assail:rut, not seeing horn far the cncmy is 
away, will fccl bound to takc up tlic challcngc till niorc dcfinitc 
knoivlcdgc of his position is obtnincd. This :it lcast mill bc thc cnsc 
with tlic ndvnnccd guard artillcry, tliough tlic winforcing guns might 
at oncc advaiicc to n closcr range. Thc diflicultj- of rcgulating dis- 
tant firc, with no puffs of smoh-c toguidc the coinlcandcis of bsttcrics, 
cannot tiit lcnd to considciablc mid incrcnscd cspcuditnrc of nmmu- 
xiition bcforc the truc rangc is found, in spitc of all improvcmcnts in 
sights and rnngc-findcrs. Commaiiding positions for guns will be 
sought aftcr more than crci; in spitc of tlic rcsulting plunging firc, 
for from such positions alonc will i t  bc possible to observc nccuratcly 
tlic position of tlic encmy’s guus, and, conscqucntly, thc rclatirc burst 
of tlic slicll. Battcrics without sncli command may liarc obscrrcrs 
stntioncd on trccs or tlic tops of Iiouscs, dlcrc  sucli exist; but a t  
prcscnt balloons ivould a p p r  to bc too complicatcd and bulky for 
that purposo with n ficld nrxny. 
Smokclcss powdcr niny also cnablc guns to rcmaiii in action at  
closcr intcrrals, since tlic InFing of olio gun is no longci* impcdcd by 
tlic smoke of its ricighbonr. ITcnco n largcr nnIutcr mq- bc brought 
iiito action in n. givcii space. 
Laying bj- mcans of pickcts and cliuomctcrs from rcvcrsc slopcs is 
somctimes advocatcd as a nicaIis of escaping loss. T’lic disadvantugc 
of smoko is hcrc fclt to n less extent; but for nn assailant snch a 
mctliod can ucvci’ succccd, for tllcrr) mould be grcnt daiigcr of firing 
into onc’s on-n adraiicing infnntrj ns tlicy approacli the cnciny-to 
say nothing of tho inferior shooting. A wry wcak dcfcnsivc forcc 
might, liowercr, rcsort to it. 
In gcnernl thc iiiflucncc of tlic formation of ground will bc in- 
’ “ Rcvuc d’Artillcric,” Junc, 1890. 
I‘ Rcriic cl’drtillcric,” J;inunry, 1630. 
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THE TACTICAL OPERITIOSS OF TIIE FUTURE. 403 
crcascd, for folds of tlic ground, woods, hedgerows, R-c., wil! nlono 
],:ire to bc relied on for concealing movenicnts. Should tlicso not 
exist in an cnemy's liosition, his rcscrrcs moying up citlicr in attack 
or dcfcnce will bc subject to cannonadc morc t l in i i  crcr. It thcrc- 
fore bccomcs an nbsolutc ncccssity to silcncc thc opposing guns bcforc 
taking tho offensire. 
Shields for guns havc been powerfully advocated as tcnding to 
,diminish losses, but it wolild appcar tliat tlicj- rriiglit 0 t h -  n desirable 
tnrgct to an cucmy, and i t  is only durins the laying of tlic gun that  
tlic gunners would bencfit by t h m .  Ucsides, t h y  offcr no protection 
to  limbcrs nut1 tcnms. 
Arfi2loy v. Infanfry. 
Artillcry miry have opportunities of surprising infautrj columns a t  
long rangc in thc futnrc ns in thc past, aiid tLc fnct of not seeing 
whence tlic sliclls conic will add to the cffect on tlic ncrws of thc 
infantrr, and cause tliem to deploy sooner than miglit otlicrmiso bc 
tlic casc. On tlic otlicr Iinnd artillery IiaVc morc to fear from tlic 
firc of skirmishcrs in crampcd country w1:cro thcy can crccp up 
within range. The grcatcr r:in,nc of tlic infnntry wcapon and abscncc 
of smokc on both sides will makc it casicr for thc skirmisher to pick 
off the gunners. Captain Xoch' rclatcs an incidcnt at tlic bnttlc of 
Sedan which has a bearing on this subject. A nnrarian skirmisher 
had cstnblislicd himsclf axnorig thc bmncIics of n trcc within cnsy 
rangc of somc French infantry lining n wall ncar Bnlaii. l"roni.tliis 
position hc kept picking off the men a t  n particular part of tlic wall, 
arid it was a considcmblo .timc bcforc the srnoko procccding from the 
trcc bctraycd him. Similarfeats will now be morc cnsy; and if this 
wns done iigninst infantry, vhy not against artillcry ? 
Yaclriiie-Guns. 
Thc cffcet of snokclcss powder on machinc-guns is probably inorc 
distinctlj to thcir admntagc tlinri it is to any of the otlicr arms. The 
succcssful cinploymcnt of these vicapons dcpcuds mainly 011 tlicir not  
being knoclicd to picccs or caused to rctirc by tho cncmy's guns in 
tlic cai.licr stages of tlic figlit. Smokclcss powder will render it nest 
f o inipossiblo for artillcry to distinguish thcir position, if i ~ c l l  placed, 
nnd tlicrcforc tlicy uo longcr offcr such n. target ns they dici-iii the 
ihnco-Gcrmnn Lattlcs. Tlint being so, tlicy rcinnin avai1;iLlc for 
turning thcir n.1101~ attcntioii to hostile infantry or to any artillcry or 
cnc-dry yhich rcnturc within effectiyc i m g c  of tlicni. 
AS regards tlic firing of the machine-guns themselves, it is xs-ell 
Inoini that witli Mack powder it is.impossiblc for tlic firer to scc 
O T C ~  tlic sights iiftcr tlic first round or tmo. With srnokclcss powder 
that dificulty disappcnrs, and continuous accnmtc firc c:in bc kcpt up 
fit a11 critical moments. Thc cffect docs not,as with artillcry, dcpcntl 
cln tkc accuracy of onc shot, but on that of n quick succcssion of shots. 
3 1: 2 
J:criic tl'-htillcric," p. 394 16SD. 
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404 THE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 
Thus, w i t h  the old powdcr the machinc-gun in action was sccn ivitb 
out being able to see the enemy. NOW the firer can scc the cnemp 
without being seen. 
The Command of a11 Army ir r  23allle. 
Formerly two lines of smokc showcd tlic Commander-in-chief and 
his subordinates thc cxact respective positions of the combatantg. 
This will be thc case no longer. The Comrnandcr of an army, oF 
crcn of au army corps, must still further rcly on the reports of othem 
and ~ e c  with thcir ejes .  
tlie country will bc obtainable, and the approach of largo masses will 
not remnin undiscovered. Austrian Otlicers stat0 that thc Crown 
Prineo'b: troops p ined  Clilum, tlic kcy of tho Koniggratz position, 
unseen, thiaugh tlic air being thick with powder smokc. This is no t  
likely to happen again. Pcrliaps, also, the smoke of tlic Gcrman gun8 
and Frcnch infantry hid from tho latter tho strength of thc Saxon 
turning movement a t  St. Privat. 
On thc other Iinnd, a h t t c r  gcncral r icw 
Ej'cct of Smokeless Poicdcr and Btagatbic Rges on Cacalry. 
" Cavalry Rill suffer more than any other branch of thc Serricc by 
tlic introduction of srnokclcss powder, for their bcst friend i n s  alwvgs 
tho smokc which reiled their attack and which nlws ti mndc difficulties 
Officer on the subject. Let ns cxaminc lion- far his opinion may b 
ncccptcd. . 
At hlars In, Toni; the great modern battle in which cavalry plajcd 
an important part, wc find that cvcry charge mndc against infantry 
or  artillery was directed against their front. nrcdow's was against 
tho front of 12 guns arid swept tlirougli them to fall on infnntry and 
cavalry in rear. Doubtless tlic smokc of the guns assisted t h c p n n d  
i n  conccaling thc onset (for tho cnrnlry werc not seen till within 
400 yards of the guns), and littlc loss was expcricnccd in this first 
stagc. It was during tho rctrcat for morc than a milc through a 
largo part of tlic I"rench Army that tlic great loss tool; plncc. T l i n ~  
the disadvantage of attacking tho front, whethcr of guns or infantrg, 
is clear, and this disadvnntagc will, no doubt, bo so mneli increased 
by the nbsencc of smokc a d  the improvcIncnt in  weapons, that it will 
require rery farourablc circumstances and formation of ground to 
allow any cliaiico of success to such a charge. , 
It is to be rcmcmbcrcd, howercr, that  them samc canscs linre 
necessitated much more opcn formations f o r  infantry, which now figlit 
practically in long thin lines. It is considcrcd also that in open 
ground, such as is favourable for cavalrr, tho supports and reserves 
of infantrf will haw to deploy in likc manner. That bciiig 60, thcir 
front is cvicleritly wry strong against cavalry attack, but their flalih-s 
becomo proportionately weaker, for therc may exist no cloecd bodics 
for tho infantry in finding tho object aimed at, , I f  mites a Gcrman 
Bicbcrjtcin '' Colburn'p U.S. Map.," Frbrunrr, 1890, p. 399. (Translation.) 
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TJlE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 405 
rer~r to bring firc to  bcar on a flank csccpt tliosc far in rear. Tlie 
flallks of artillery arc also \wak in thcmselvcs and rcqiiirc protection 
fl.orll thc othcr arms. It has nln-ays Lccn tlie casc that cnvalrr attack 
js 11lost to bc fcarcd and lias grcatcst chnnecs of success from ajlank. 
r r l l C s ~  chanccs arc not, thercforc, nffcctcd so much by the improve- 
,ucnt in \\-capons, and such an attack can bc supported by infantiy o r  
artillcry fire to tlic last moment. Wlicn the cavalry has swcpt along 
tllc Iiostilc linc, tho dist:incc it has to retreat under fire is compara- 
tirclg short, and vcry differcnt from that which Bredow’s curalry lind 
t o  trarcrsc. 
such opportunities for flank attacks may not oftcn occui’, bnt as 
they pi.oniisc great rcsults i r i  giving breathing timc, when thc infantry 
are orcrmntchcd, tlicy will bc souglit aftcr by cntcrprising cavalry 
1e:ldcrs. KO doubt if nll bnttlcficlds ivcrc pcrfectly flat plains wlicrc 
ercry nioremcnt could bc sccn for miles, o r  consisted of irxipimtic:ablc 
country, thc caralry rble would be lituitcd to watching tho flnnks of 
tlic cIicni7 and opposing cntcrpriscs by liostilc cavalry. n u t  it is 
scklom that placcs cannot bc found dicrc  considcrablc Lodics of 
car:ilrj may remain Iiiddcn and move for considci~llc distances un- 
scm. Wlicn such are obtainable tlicy g k c  much inore cffcctire cover 
t1ir.n sniokc. &re, again, \vc find incrcascd iniportnncu nttaclcd to 
the formation of thc  ground arid the intelligcnt use of it. 
A s  illustrating what mar bc donc in war by what lias hnppcned in 
peacc, at tlic Gcrman xnanacuvrcs’ of 1870 a rcgimcnt of Innccrs sur- 
priscd and charged four battalions \rho did not scc tliem till within 
200 jnrds of their flnnk. Scarccly a sliot was fired bcforc they wcro 
among tho  iufnntrj-. Thc decision given, with tho approval of thc  
Xrnpcror and von Moltkc, was that thrcc battalions wcrc placed hors 
cle c o ~ ~ i l a l .  Tho Coloncl commanding tlic lnncers lind n~ovcd pcr- 
sonally to a d l - c h o s c n  spot, liad been quietly observing tho mow- 
incuts of tlic infantry, himself unsccn up to tlic moment whcn 1ic:gavr 
tlic signal to his rcgimerit to clinrgc. 
Tlic sen-icc of rcconnnissancc is, howcrer, now of such iniportnncc 
and will harass cnvulrr to suclinn extent, tliat i t  is unIikc1~- that large 
bodics of thnt arm will bc used nctually on tlie battlc5cld. Stuall 
bodies, say not larger than a regiment, will inow faster, bc more 
crisily hidden, nud not 60 readily tlirown into confusion, and will, 
tliercforc, fulfil tlic duty of suprising a n  cncmy bcttcr than Iargc 
ni:isscs of horsemen such ns ~ ~ I J C ~ I .  to find favour in Gcrruany a t  tlie 
prcscnt morncnt. Siriglo Iiorserncn may also IIC found most uscful 
nctunlly on tlic field of battlc to discorcr morcments of tlic ciicmy. 
As Prince KixW obscrv.es, such small objects as intliridunl liorsemcn 
arc anlikclp to attinct Grc, 6UCli is the po~vcr of licstilc Grc to cngrogs 
the attention of infantry and artillcrj- in action. 
As rcgnrds tlic dismountcd nction of cavalry, tlic mngazinc carbine 
will doubtless add considerably to tlic dcfcnsive poivcr of thc arm, in 
holding defiles, bridgcs, &c. 
Against routed infantry, cavalry nre likely to act as effectively ILS 
l Article on “ War,” “ Encjelopxcdio Dritannica.” 
? “7th Lettcr on Canlrj.” 
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406 THE TACTICAL OPERATLOSS OF THE FUTURE:. 
ever, for thcn i t  mnttcrs littlc whetlicr thc formei. arc armed \vitll 
pitchforks or  with magazine rifles, for tlioy will bc incapablc of using 
them. 
Ilecorriiaissni2cc.-lt ia p c r h a p  in thc duties of rcconnaissnncc that 
cavalry (and iufantry also whcn thus employed) will find the greatest 
cliango in coinparison with tlic sarne undcr thc old conditions. Witl, 
thc old powder, thc first shot fired a t  :L patrol gnoo warning of tho 
csact position of an enemy. With smokeless powdcr this is no 
longcr tlio casc, and :dl that can bc crpcctc? is that tltc path of t]lc 
bullct niny give roughly tho direction of thc firer niid tlic sound some 
idca of tho range. A cavalry patrol, stopped by riflo firc with tho old 
powder, could on its rcturn givc somo information of tlic encmy's 
position, but with tlic ncw tlicir rcport must bc niorc mcngrc, nild 
thcir cliances of having bccn surprised by :in anibnsh of niagnzino 
firc grcatcr. Hcnco rcconnaissancs must in futurc l.m morc costly. 
Tlic samc holding good on both sidcs, i t  ouglit to bc easier to corcp 
onc's own front and prcvcnt thc cncnifs patrols pcnctinting the 
screcn. Tlic result of a11 this will bc to cnliancc tLc rainc of good 
cjcsight arid aids to vision, such as ficld glnsscs. Tlic troops wliich 
aro clothcd in tlic least lirilliant uniform aiid cquippcd with tho least 
shiny nccoutrcmcnts will hold a great ndvitiitagc orcr tlic otlicr sidc, 
witli caralry ns with infantry. Grcy Iiorscs will bc a t e  great dis- 
adrant:ige. It follo\\-s, that  training sclcctcd men in  pcncc timc iii 
tlic obsewntion of distant objects and in sending reports will Lc .as 
important to tlic cavalry as training in obscrvntion of firo is to thc 
artillerj-. As onc man can see as wcll as fiftj-, and cnii move morc 
quickly :ind is rnncli lcss likely to be sccn, oficcrs' pntrols will bccomc 
inore common and mom important in thcir rcsnlts. It may sonic- 
times bo ncccssarj to send a11 tho officers of a squadroii, cxccpt tlic 
Captain, on tlicsc dutics. This will ncccssitnte, on tlic othcr sidc, 
marc frcqucnt patrols I,lctwecn parallcl columns to guard against tlic 
cntcrpriso of thcsc ofliccrs. 
Tlic gcncnl result will bo that it is impossiblc for cavalry rrlonc to 
rcconnoitrc an c n c q  in positiori, though sometimes thc configuration 
of tlic ground may givc intelligent officcrs D slircwcl idca of his 
position. Gcncrnl Fewon's ordcrs' to tlic 18th Army Corps, a t  thc 
Yreiicli Jlauccuvrcs this year. wcrc that cavalry patrols must halt as 
soon as within tlic zonc of cffectivc firc, and infantry coinpanics Rere 
to ndvancc 011 tltc flanks and drive back tlic cucrny's posts, ofiiccrs 
Icing in rear with good ficld glasscs. Tliiis wc gct thc two cstrcmcs, 
officers' patrols and rcconnaissanccs in  force. 
Oiifposfs, ns aficctecl by Ma9azina ll&s uwZ Sniokdess Polctler. 
From what lins bccii said abovc, it is cvidciit that tllc prccisc position 
of tlic outpost liuc mill bo moro difticnlt to iiiakc out. Tho sentry 
~ l i o  gims tlic nlarm by firing his rifle neccl not tlicrcby bctray his 
position, and, in spitc of what 1i:m bccn said to tho contrary, the noisc 
of thc rcport is quito suilicicnt to rcacli the picquct. 
" Atiny nnd Xw-j Gazcttc;" J n l ~  t'Ctli, 1890. 
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THE TACTICAL OPEILLTIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 407 
This difficulty in gcttitrg informatioil of thc  outpost lint? will makc 
it all thy morc Jicccssary to snrpriso scritrics and picqucjs, for tlic 
rcsuIts will bc moro vnlunblc. Tho flash of a rifle being secn at night, 
,,-]do invisible by day, mny cnusc :ittexnpts on the outposts by night 
All this means harder and niorc h:rrassing 
work 011 outpost duty, but thc supcrior defcnsivc power of tllc modcrn 
rifle ought to nllcriritc this Ip rcdncing thc number of inen nccessnrF 
in tlic ontpost line y h c n  in  contact with an enemy. Thus, whcro 
1,000 rncn per xuilc wcro formcrly ncccssary, 600 or 700 may now- 
s~~ff jcc ,  as long as thc h i c  of obscrvntion is not tlicreby rcduccd. 
Gicerilla lVarjarc.-Thc facilitics affordccl for surprising patrols, 
&c., by mcans of improvcd wcnpons and nmmunition, mill add to thc  
pov-cr of tlic gucrilln in :imbusliing find liarassing an cncmy. It 
niust be met on tho otlicr sidc by increnscd wcrtchfulncss and activity 
iJ1 reconiiai~sancc. 
becornc morc frequent. 
R;Sstr,,l~. 
Thc cffccts of smokcless pou-dcr 011 tlic minor tactics of tbc  future 
hfanfr!y.-l. Incrcascd facilitics for firc discipliric and control. 
2. Inipro~-cd shooting individually, both iu rapidity nrid accuiacy. 
3. Kon-bctmgnl of prcscncc of skirmishcrs in broken ground, of 
4. Iiicrcnscd . facilities for comiaandcrs of units combining action 
On thc othcr 1inud:- 
6 .  Erposurc of moving bodics, such ns :dtackiiig lines, supports, 
and rcscrvcs. 
6. Consequently deplolymcnt will t a l a  placc furtlicr a~ray froni 
cnemy. 
7. And thc strength of thc dcfcncc against frontal attack ovcr opcii 
grouud will bc incrcnscd, but not ovei’ cr;irnpcd ground. 
S. Grcnter iniportnncc of corer. 
Jforalc piwbably gains in rcspcct of mcn knowing d i n t  they arc 
about, but loses by rcnson of their sccing comrades call nronnd therii, 
cspccinlly on thc defc~isirc, and b j  not  knowing wlicrc thc bullets 
COIIIC from, morc particulnrly on tliu offcnsivc. 
may bc bricfly summcd up as follows :- 
scntries on outpost duty, or  of firing linc of dcfencc. 
with adjaccnt units. 
ATtiZle2y.-l. Improred shooting a i d  firc disciplinc. 
2. Incrcascd rapidity of firc. 
3. Slightly rcdnccd wcight of ammunition. 
4. Grcatcr possibility of masking bnttcrics, and thcir position 
rcmaining nndiscovorcd. . Hciicc importancc of covcr. 
5 .  Obscrratiorls of fire casicr, if lnrgc objcct in ncighbourhood of 
cncmy’.s giins bc choscn to regulntc fire by, and not guns themsclves 
unless plainly seen. 
6. Ticrs of fir0 possible. 
7. Guns must unlimber out of sight wlien possible, and bo run up 
into position by hand. 
Ot!iei*\visc obscrvntion of firc nioro difficult.. 
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40s TI1E TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF TUE FUTURE. 
8. Adrantagc of first firc makc long rangcs probnblc r.t first. 
!). Grcnter fncilitics for suppoi-tiiig nri iiifnntiy attack from 
distnncc. 
10. A Iargcr nuiiibcr of guns can be brooght irito nction iii a given 
Sl1"CC. 
11. hpproacli of infantry masscs to attack guns cniinot bc made 
IIIISCCII as nt Kijniggrntz. 
n u t  12. Iiidiridunl skirniishers tlins approncliirig in cramped ground 
and pickiiig off giirincrs will bc dillicult to dctcct. 
13. .Cliangcs of position will bc morc opcn to view, a i d  tlicrcfopc 
inore daiigcrous t1:nn formerly. 
14. Siricc smokclcss powtlcr gircs tho bcst rcsults wlicn dctonatcd, 
it bccomcs almost a iicccssitr to iiitroduce nictal cartridge cases with 
tlic necessary detonating arrangements. 
Jlirc7~ins-G'1rtis.-l. Invisibility to cncmy's artillcry. 
2. Possibility of kccping up continuous ant1 accurate fire withont 
stopping to rclaj- tlic gun. 
But 3. C1i:uiges of position opcn to'Ticw. 
CarccZry.-In conjunction with iiingazinc rifles thc cffcct of smoke- 
less powdcr on cavalry will bu :- 
I. Possiblr fciver cliances for cliargin,rr othcr arms than Lcforc, 
since tlic front of infantry and artillcry will gcncrallj bc invul. 
11crable. 
2. Ncrcrtlicless clianccs for flank attacks will still occnr. 
3. Thcsc attacks will probnblg not be uiidcrtnkcri b j  larger bodies 
4. Incrcnscd diliicultj of rcconnaissnncc and probnblo neccssitj fop 
5. Greater powcr of lioldiug bridges and clcfilcs wlicn dismounted. 
Comnzon to oll Amis.-l. Greater visibility in motion. 
2. Incrcnscd invisibilitg at rcst. 
3. Incrcnscd importaiicc of making usc of ground ns COVCI.. 
4. Probabilitg of rcconiiaiss:incc bj night bceoming morc frequent. 
5. IrnIiossibilitj of retrcating nriilcr cover of smoko and conscquciit 
incrcascd loss to the rnnqnislied. 
6. Preliminary stages of fight will takc a lougcr timc, though once 
within decisive rnngc thc decision will bc morc qnickly brought 
about. 
than n rcgimciit. 
adding to tlic offcnsim fire pon-cr of cavalry. 
7. X'ecessig for lieu trnl tiiitcd uniform and equipment. 
J[AGIZISE RIFLES. 
LZcil Results forefoZd.-Tlic iiitroduction of tlicsc weapons was not 
accoinplislicd witliout a great deal of criticism aud ominous pro- 
pliccics on tlic pnrt of not a fcw autlioritics. It was forctolcl that 
they would c:iusc an irnmcnsc wastc of alumunition and an cntiic 
absericc of firc control. Tlicsc critics liavc not yct bcen provcd wrong 
by actual war cspcricncc, but it is probable that cnrcful thought, com- 
Linedwitli crpcrirueuts, mill sliow us how toavoid tlio cvils prophcsicd. 
KO doubt a mob, or cven badlj--traincd soldicrs, armed with magazine 
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TIIE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF TIIE FUTURE. 40!) 
riflCS, would do no bcitcr than if tlicy Iiad mcrcly singlc-loa.dci.s, pro- 
,-ide(I tlic swno amount of niiimunitiori were supplicd in  1~0th cases, but 
fire discipline of tlic strictest kind ought to go R long way towards 
orcr tho difficultics which lic in tilo WRY of dcrcloping tlic 
power of tlic new \vcapon. That cluc to smokc bliiidiiig tlic fire aftcr 
tllc first round or two lins airendy bccn got ovci, and tho abscncu of 
s m ~ k c  will also assist tliu commander in tlic gcncrnl control of his 
llait. Without snokcless posvdcr it is doubtful wlictlicr nny grcat 
rtlv:irhyc \rould I)?. rcapcd from t.lic introduction of rringiaiiic rifles. 
Arafrtre of fhe  lVeupott.--Tlic wcapons of thcnisclws do riot nppcar 
t o  1v:irmnt ally iw-olntion in tactics. Tlicy siniply mean Fiving to 
tlQops the powcr of firing for n tinic coiisidcraldy morc rapidly than 
with a single-londcr. Colonel 1~61~11’ says : “ Tlic riflc as n rcpcater 
0lfci.s to tho soldier a constant and contiiiuous reitdincss to firc, which 
is prcscrmd by nicans of its careful nnd judicious application, nnd by 
-Tho soldier must 
be:ir in mind tliat his arm incre:ises tlic necessity for n tliorougli firc 
discipliiie, and tlint tho rcpcating arrangement is iriiendcd to heighten 
tho actual cffcct of the firc, and not only to incrmsc its rapidity.” 
superior mnge and flatter tiajcctog add to tlic incrcascd powcr of 
tlic n’capon, wliilc smokeless powder makes tlin shooting more nccii- 
ratc, and the result is that troops will figlit at grcatcr distances and 
in ICSS vulncrnblc formations than forinci*ly. ’‘ Changcs in arins 
usunlly producc modi6cations iu tactics, but as n rule iii thc tactical 
juritiafioiis only, and not in tho priuciplcs of tlic combat as rcgards 
:ittack and dcfcncc.”’ 
Chief Dijbxlfy 1;r.s in Replaatiott of Hre.-As inferred above, it is 
in fire disciplinc tlint the cliicf difficulty with tlic mngazinc riflc \\-ill 
be cxpcrienccd. Tho incrcasc of powcr now placed in tlic hands of 
tho soldier may be entirely wasted i f  not spplicd a t  tho right moment 
and on tlic riglit object. 
Jfeaits of Ocercotiiity tliis Difiiciilty.-“ WIicri firing oncc begins 
men easily get out of liand unless rcstraincd by an iron discipline,” 
says Princo Kraft. ‘ I  Firc disciplinn mcaiis deccntixlization of 
authoritj; no superior cnn propcrly control more tlinn four to eight 
subordinates, SO’ lct this bo rccogriizcd nud ccirricd out throuuli cvcry- 
thing, and let encli supcrior bo altowcd thc control of thys liinited 
niimbcr.”s Foreign rcgulntions now recognize as necessary such 
cxtrcmc dcceiitmlization. Tho Gcrinans diridc tlicir zugs iuto groups 
of eight nien uudci. a non-commissioned ofliccr for purposes of firc 
disciplinc, and this sjstcrn is also followd by Frnncn arid Austria. 
Agaiiist smoothbores control of firc arid YolIcy firing by battalions ~vas 
tlic cnstom. With cvcry iiuprovcment in ~vcnpous this unit of firc 
coilti-ol bccomcs smaller ; tlius, with brccchloiidcrs in tho Warof 1870,it 
yas nttcniptcti to control tlic fire of compnnics of 250 rncnalniost direct 
from tlic Captain. Tlic attcmpt signally failed, bccause tliat nurnbcr 
1 R.U.S.I. Journal,” vol. xxxii, 
3 “CIimge3 in 3Iilitary BIntters k8f; 1857,” “ R.U.S.T. JournnI,” rol. xxxii, 
continual and timely filling up of the ningaziiic. 
1’. 835. 
“Uisciplinc,” “R.U.S.1. Journ31,” rol. xxxiii, p. 30:. 
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410 THE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OIJ TUE FUTURE. 
iudc  too 1mgc a unit for thc wcapon ngrinst them. Thc Ccrman sptcu, 
of training of thc day lind not contcniplatcd sucli dcccntrdization 
was rcally ncccssnry for thc cfficiciit conduct of firc, and therefore in 
most C ~ S C S  tlio firc dcgeneratcd into siniplc indcpcndcnt firing. 111 
tlio Frcnch Army apparcntly fire disciplinc was almost unknown 
that timc. Hcncc, as a rcsnlt of thc cxpcriciiccs of that war, the 
prcscnt Continental systcm of dcccntrdization, cstcnding down to 
groups of about cight mcn, l n s  glawn up. Sncli n nunibcr ns this, 
bcsidcs bcing casy to control, will present Imt n sninll mark for all 
cacmy. If this system bc ncccptcd 1ct tlic training of mcxi in pcacc 
timc a11 tcnd in that dircction. Thc confusion of tlic battlcficld arid 
thc mixture of units is bound to take place again as i t  did in 18io. 
Onr task is to innkc thc confusion mow appaicnt tlinn rcal, nnd if 
thc units bc so small they can 1i:mg togctlicr longcr. 
9’hc Decisirc Ifamp.-l3nt what, aftcr all, is tlic infantiy fight 
A Gcrman autlioritj‘ tclls us: ‘“l‘lic iiifantrF figlit will resolve 
itsclf into a prolorigcd and costly strngglc, necessitating bringing up 
the rc:ir lincs. Their den- i l l  bc to fccd thc fighting linc aud rcplsce 
tlic waste, thus hccomirig n mcrc source of supply. . . . . The 
absurd idca of attcmpting to dccide tlic issnc by nttacliing;mith innsscs 
of troops brought up from thc rcnr in closc formation must needs 
suffcr considcrablc xriodificatioti, 1st. 3cc:iusc tlicp will 1ia-r~ to be 
dissolrcd to fccd tEc fighting linc; 2nd. Uccausc it will bc quitc im- 
possible for thc innsscs to trarcisc tlic firc zonc.” 
Tho distaucc at  d i i c h  tlic ‘‘ prolonged and costly strugglc I’ will 
tnko placc will doubtlcss vary according to thu ground. On open 
ground, owing to thc fiattcr trajcctor3 and superior accuracr of the 
prcscnt riflc, it will probably Ic greater than in tho days of single- 
londcrs. A writer in tlic ‘( 31ilitiir Wochcnblntt,”’ cstimatcs it duiing 
tho last wars a t  200 to 300 mctrcs. ‘ I  In the wars of tlic futnrc,” 
lic says, “ tlic dccisirc fusilladc will tnkc placc a t  300 to 400 mCtrCg, 
or cren more.” Gcricral Fcrron,3 in his instructions to tlic l8tli Army 
Corps, this p a r ,  tells his suborcliuatcs that, oving to magazinc rifles 
and tho abscncc of smokc, the objcct of tlic attack is to constitutc a 
firing Iinc a t  700 to 400 mctrcs supcrior to thc cncmy and tlicli force 
Iiim to quit by artillcry and infantrj- firc cornbhcd. 
It sccms probable, judging br past cspericiicc of changcs in 
rrcnpous, thnt thc abovo r i c m  arc corrcct, and that o-icr oyei, groiiiid 
thc dccisirc mngazinc fusilladc will tako placc somcwlicrc froni 
YO0 to 700 prds  froni thc cncmy. Whcn tho ground allows a ncarcr 
approach, howcvcr, tho combatants may gct much closer. At 
Ihjuba: the critical momciit occurred wlicn tho nocrs wcrc ivithin 
30 or 40 Fards of our linc, and tlic formation of thc ground would 
not hnrc allo~rcd tlint distancc to bc raricd with cithcr magazinc 
iitlcs or mnzzlc-loaders. 
1 Major Kcim, “Prcsciit Stitc of T a c t i d  Scieilcc,” “ ILU.S.1. Journal,” KO. 15% 
p. 5 w. 
2 1st Article, KO. 106. 
4 “Cnrtct’s History of tlic Uocr War.” 
“ h j  and Xavy Qntettc,” July 26t11,lSI)O. 
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THE TACTICAL OPERIITIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 411 
rfic ~iffacP.-Tlic task for the attack is, thcii, to find out mcans by 
this powcrful linc of firc can be brought up to tho ilccisivc 
‘iist8ncc m-itli tbc Icast possiblc loss in men, iiioi~ilc, and firo dis- 
cipline. Tlic nations of the Contincnt liarc solvcd thc qucstion much 
in thc same wvny ns far as cnn bc donc without actunl war, thc solu- 
tion k i n g ,  by gcncml conscnt, lirics of men iu cstcndcd order COW 
stituting tlic firing linc, f o l l o \ d  by supports nud rcscr~cs whose 
duty it is to fccrl this line and urge it forward. Yct voiccs ire 
~casional ly  raiscd against niany clctnils of this system, owing to tlio 
difficulty of controlling rncn in estcndctl order, and of prercnting 
st.r&ogling. Pcrhaps the most rcmarkablc protest is tho “ Summer 
XjgEt’s Dream," n translation of which froni tho Gcrmnii appcaxd in 
the Unitcd Scrricc Mngnzinc.’ Tlic writer liopcs to find n rcmcdg 
for the firc discipline difliculty, wid for the irnrncriso amount of 
straggling which took placc in 1870, in .“rcjuvcn:itcd lincnr tactics, 
suitable for modern fighting and consisting of handy single ranks 
with no depth of formation.” Tlic rcal fighting unit is fixed a t  n 
quarter of n Gerrnau company, o r  about fifty men, which must advance 
in single rank in liiic, thc men kccping tlic touch ivlicn tlic gronncl 
8 1 1 ~ ~ s  of it, and firi?g vol le~s by word of command. By an iron 
&sciplinc men arc not allowcd to take corcr in ditchcs and otlicr 
places from which i t  might be difficult to mow tlicm for :I. furthci- 
adrancc. Tho cowr’ nllowcd to the firing liiic nppcars to bc only 
wliat can bc obtniucd by lying down, which is clonc by word of com- 
mand. This system bears n rcmarkablc rescrublancc to tho rnethod 
of attack a t  prcscnt laid down fo r  our Scrvicc ir i  innny particulars, 
and also to that of thc French Army, as cinplopd at this year’s 
manccuvrcs. 
Jleans for attaining the J h i n  Objmt.--Rccping our innin object in 
vicw, &., tlie cstablishmcnt of n powcrful firing linc :it clccisirc clis- 
tancc from tlic cncmj, 1ct us considcr how to gct this firing linc up to  
this position. 
(1.) Corering Pire.-It is cvidcnt that thc cncmy must haw his 
attcntiori clistractcd, and must be kcpt from showing liimsclf nborc 
his sheltcr trcnchcs by coceringjre, which must bc kcpt up as long ns 
possible. LIcrc comes in tho immcnso ixnportnncc of tlic sliapc of tho 
ground, which to favoui. the attack should cnnblc such covcring fire 
to bc kept up. till tho nrriral of tlic firing linc a t  tlic dccisirc dis- 
tancc. Apart from artillcry, it is probable that tlic iucrcascd rangc 
of rnodcrn rifles will cnablc cffcctive covcring fire to bo made usc or 
by infantrr rcscrvcs, as is said to havc bccri donc by tlic Bocrs at 
Majuba. 
(2.) Rapid ddcaiicc.-Thc fighting linc shonld bc csposcd to the 
encmy’s fire for as short :I time as possiblc. Thercforc it must Inow 
forward as quickly as is consistcnt with stcndincss and viitli arriring 
a t  tlic dcsircd clistancc witliont nnduly fatiguing tlic rncn. 
(3.) Powerful Firing &inc wider Strict Control.-Thc firing line 
should bc as powcrful as possiblc without crowding. As thc antlioi- 
Julie, July, nix1 August, 1630. 
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412 T I E  TLICTICAL OPERATIOSS OF TIIE FUTURE, 
of tlic “ Siilnmcr Night’s Dream ” conclusively provcs, this is only to 
bc done IIJ placiug rncn in onc linc, and tliereforc niiy qs tcm in 
which men arc not closclr conncctcd appcars to IM foundcd on RTOng 
principlcs. Y’lic old cxtcndcd ordcr was only suitablc for fikirmisliars 
w-110 \wrc so f:ir npart as riot to intcrfcrc with cncli otlicr’s fire. 
“TJic skirniislicr placcd in a dcnsc linc lias in rcality no rriorc 
fiacdom in clioicc of covcr than thc xnnn in closc order.’” IIe omnot 
g o  forwards or backwards to scck covci’ without intcrfcring wit11 his 
ncighbour’s firc. “Thc bcst way of a\-oidiiig the cfl’cet of tlic 
encniy’s firc is fo lic down, a i d  troops in closc ordcr can do this as 
easily ns firing lincs. Our company columns arc skillcd in  tlic art of 
utilizing nntiii*al fcaturcs of thc ground to npproacli aii cncmy un- 
seen."? +in ns rcgnrds thin skirmishing lincs : “ I do not dis- 
putc tlic vnluc of thin lincs of skirmishcrs WIICII no scrious cngagc- 
mcnt is iiitcnded. . . . . But if you arc going to commcncc 
your attack witli so thin a firing linc as to hnl-c 5 or 6 pnccs intcrral 
bctwccn files, ycur skirmisliers will indeed iiavc smaller Iosscs, but 
yoiir troops in close order ‘(supports) greater losscs. Tlio ciicmy 
who opposes p i  with a dcusc firing liiie will Iia\ a, with :in equal 
front, twicc o r  tliiw! times. tlic number of riflcs in action. Your 
reinforccmcnts on tlicir way up will bc insuflicicntly protcctcd by thc 
firing linc and will bo niinihilntcd. . . . . Firc disciplinc will 
bc difficult from tho oiicsct.”5 Aftcr describing Iiow lic would linrc 
tlic units opcn ranks to pass obstacles in cramped ground, hc goes 
on: ‘I I t  is prccisely in  cmmpcd country that yon must iiccd colic- 
sion and dash since all tlic advantagcs arc on thc sidc of tlic 
dctcrmincd attack. Nowlicrc is crtcndcd ordcr, ‘&)f. consfarrtly 
m ~ i ~ i t a i ~ ~ c d ,  morc unsuitnblc and dnngcrous tlinn in such country.” 
How truc this was of tlic wood figlitiiig in 18iO. 
It is self-cvidcnt tliat such compnrativcly closc ordcr will makc 
firc disciplinc and control morc casy, and thcrcforc tlic firc will bc 
morc cffcctirc and i ts  effect on the cnerup grcathr. Conscqucntly, 
fewer nicn will bc lost, for  tho formntion will losc least which can 
do most ixijury to an cncxny ; and troops in singlc muk keeping thc 
tqucli rcnlly offcr no bettcr targct tlinn cloncls of skirmishcrs. 
Finally, troops in such dc6nitc formations would be much moro 
likcly to niai*cl~ forward than thosc in crteiidcd o d c r  with a11 
i ts  attendant crils. This is sufficiently illustrated by tho writcr oE 
tlic pamplilct nbnrc mcntioncd, alien hc dcscribes’ l i o ~ ,  in  a battlc in 
1870. liis incn, wlio were holding togethcr and advancing, soddenly 
disnppenrcd in crcry dircction b u t  tliat of tlrc ciicmy, wlicn ordcrcd to 
cxtcnd lq a supcrior oflicer. 
The ccriclusion is thcrcforc arrived at that ttic firing linc, to be 
rcnllg porn-crful, cffcctive, and uudcr control, should bc composcd of a 
linc of rncn, nllowing a yard pcr man, tho d io lc  linc to bc split up 
into uiiits cadi of which has its lcadcr and second in comrnnnd, this 
dcccntraliration of authority cstcuding down to groups of a b u t  
eight rncn. 
I‘ Suiiimer Xiglit’s Drcain,” U.S.M.,” p. 213. ’ ILid. 
3 r. 214. 1’. 3 a .  
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TIlE TACTICIL OPERITIOSS OF THE FUTUIiE. 113 
It is niost probnblc tha t  Coloxicl Llallen aims a t  gctting much 
ncarcr tho cucrny for the tlccisivc combat, and in niucli lnrgcr uiiiLs 
tlinn will bo possible with modern vxapons, b u t  thc “ Urcaui ” itself 
must bc taken niorc n s  iiicro spccinl plcadixig on h l i n l f  of firo dis- 
cipline. Firing must and will coninicrico as soon :is scrioiis losscs 
begin to bc crpcricnccd, so lorig as thc cuemy’s position cau lo mndc 
out. 
Aftcr condcmning the admncc under licavy fir0 witlioiit rcturiiinK 
it,  Major Kcixn says:’ “ Why should a body of troops, rrcakcucd both 
pliysically axid mornlly, LC supposed to liavc Lcttcr clianccs of gcttirig 
up sooncr and xicarer to tlic ..clny than :inothcr w h o ~ c  advaxicc i s  
cnrricd out  undcr considcrably mow fnvourablc tncticnl arid moral 
coutlitions T This thcory might hold good n p i n s t  ari cxicmy infcrioi- 
both in shooting powcr nnd Ira\-ery.” 
It is wcll known that fire bccomcs less cffcctiw wlicn hostile firc i s  
snddenly opcncd on thc  firers. Oncc tlic nttucking linc h g i n s  to fire 
its  primc objcct must bc to scc tho  cpcxny axid not to seek covcr in 
the folds of tho grouiid, wlicrc tliis prcvcrits efkctivc firc. It is .to lie 
rcmexxibcrcd, lioivcvcr, tliat halting to fire mcans a certain amount of 
delay and loss of Elnn, anu-cnc l  halt f o r  tlint P U Y ~ O E C  should only 
last long cnougli to gin? xucn brcatliing timc. It is st:ited that tlic 
repulso at Lning’s Kck was partly duo to rnonntcd Officers hurrying 
on mcn on foot with moro zcal than discretion, till tlic lnttcr \vcru 
complctely blown; and RO liavc thc disnstcr of the 36th I3rig:idc 
at Mlnrs-la-Tour to rcmind us 1 x 0 ~  usclcss xncn nrc when tircd out. 
Tlioso who liavo takcn part irt art attack at a field dny ovcr 3,000 
yards of country know well horn fatiguing it is to mcn cngagcd in it. 
The  timc for halting to firc will t!icrcforc bc graspccl by coriiuiaudcrs 
of units wlicn thcy scc tlicir men can go no fnrtlier in good ordci-, 
tlirougli losscs, fatigue, bc. Whcn once this takcs plncc it is prob- 
able that some rciriforccmcnt b p  supports will bc ncccssaxy, as “ iiii- 
pnlsivc power ” oncc lost“-difiicult to regain. 
(4.) VoZley Firing.-As rcgnrds tlio method of firing, it sccms 
likcly that vollcy firing conld bc carried out by units of fifty xiicn ot- 
so to bcgix with, but wo cmnot  liopc for this to be coutinucd to  tlic 
later stages of the attack. Thc ncnrcr tlic combatants approiicll, t h e  
greater tlic losscs mid tlic loudcr tho din of battle. Under such 
czciting ckcumstnnccs, tlic units uridcr control for firing vollcys can 
no longcr LC so 1:irgo ns fifty men, m e n  aftcr dcductixig losses, and 
thcrcforc tho vollcjs will prcscntlg bccorno scctioii vollejs and the= 
group magazine Tollcys, till at  last, CWII wit11 tlic best disciplincd 
troops and a stubborn cncmy, indcpcndcnt magazine firc will dccidc 
thc  contcst. Many authoyitics think thc days of rolley fixing aro pnst, 
bu t  lvu may “lcavo the question with the rcmark that tho rnoixl 
uffcct prodnccd by a \-ollcy is too grcat for tho attcmpt to us0 it cnx- 
to  be willingly thrown away, but that  i t  wonld bo now rash to  take 
for grantcd that on scrvico the bcst troops can bo dcpciidcd on t o  
dclircr, during closo fighting, nccurntc Tollcys, unlcss i t  be in stnall 
“Prcscnt Statc of Tactical Sciciice,” “R.U.S.I. Journal,” KO. 152, p. 5M. 
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TIlE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF TIIE FUTURE. 415 
t.llis principle, and lays down the minimum rcinforcing unit nt a 
*tion. In t.hc C ~ S C  of tlic mixing of units it is to bo obecrvcd that 
t,llc mising.of tlic companies of onc battalion is much less linrmful 
t,ban tlic mixing of diffcrent battalions, for cvcry soldicr knows thc 
~ a c c r s  of tlic battalion by siglif a t  least, and most of tlic IIOU-corn- 
nlissioneil ofliccrs, SO that thc men arc much morc likely to obey them 
tllru total strangers. A s  regards (I), it must liappcu that the n u m h r  
,.cpircd to 611 up tlrc p p s  will oftcii bc uudcr or ovcr cstimatcd. 
 he forriicr crror is c d y  rcctified by more troops, and vlicn .tho 
]fitter tnkcs plncc, Coloncl ILnllcn’s plan, of tcacliirig ilii: orcrlapping 
men to firc in two ranks, sccnis thc most nntnid rcmcdj. In  ordcr 
to fulfil (c) and carry tlic wvholc linc forwwd; tlic sj-stcm dcsoribcd in 
tho 1‘ Summcr Night’s Dmarn ” sccms, again, to bc in accordance with 
Common scnsc. l35 each reinforcing unit advincing tltrorcgh tlic gap 
lj-i~ig down to fiic somc 50 p r d s  bcyond, it is rcason:iblo to snp- 
p j c  that, tho rcxnaindcr of tlic linc would bc iupcllcd to morc up to 
01’ beyond them. Knturally tlic units nenrcst tlic gap must ccnsc fir0 
alien thc rcinforccmcnt passes throngli. Tlius tho furtlicr advancc 
s i l l  i-csol\-c itsclf into altcrnitc rushcs, evcry rnsh being covcrcd 
bx firc from tlic units ljirig down. Prince %aft says :1 ‘‘ JI‘hcn o 
part of thc skirrnisliers lias tnkcn up its position ncar to thc oncmy 
and lias opcncd firc, lionour and comradeship corripcl all tlic other 
skirmislicrs to Iiurry lip to them in ordcr to share tlicir danger 
shoulder to slionldcr and to fight with thcm. TLc moment whcn thc 
echclon which lias gone first to tlio front opcns its fir0 is tlic most 
favourablc €or all othcrs to gain ground quickly, sincc thc encniy’will, 
at  this monicnt, direct all ‘Iiis rifles nt thosc skirmishers which 11av.c 
tl1c first ndmnccd.” 
Tlie Final Siage.-As beforc stated, tlic fiual crisis of tho figlit will 
take placc a t  an5 distance up to about 700 J-ards, according to tho 
nature of tho ground and tlio cncmj. Tlic msult of tlio combat will 
clcpcnd on wliicli sidc c?n bring tho most rapid and dcadly firo to bcar 
on tlic othcr. Until tlic 6.1-0 of onc sido or, tho otlier is got nndcr no 
hyonct chargc or furthcrdrancc can possibly takc p l x c  at such deadly 
r i i n p ,  for to ndvaucc ~ C ~ O S S  the opcn would g i n  thcadrantagc of firc 
to tlic enemy. Tlic timc necessary to gct over uvcii 203 yards would 
SUffiCC for the othcr sidc to turn  thc tables unlcss his firc had becn 
almost complctclj subducd. 
Flaiik Co2(12ic)’-ntfc;c~~~.-Duriiig this pcriod flank countcr-attacks 
aro much to l o  fcnrrd, and tho magazinc riflo incrcnscs tlicir power just 
as the B.L. did as comparctl with tlio 3I.L. I’rincc Kmft sap:% 
“ It is quitc truc that pressure on a flank lias now tenfold powcr,” and 
relates how at St. P r i n t  a linc of ninc Frcncli httalions which mere 
nnnoj-ing his guns and could not Lc drivcn back bj- froutal fire, retircd 
at  once when taken in flank by onc singlo Gcrninn company. IIom 
rnucli inorc mould this bc tlic casc with magazinc rifles P Thcrcforc 
cspccinl cnro must bc tnkcn, by means of cchclons of troops, to pro- 
tect tlic esposcd flanks of tlic attack. 
1 “ 12th Lettcr ou Tnfmtrr.” 
‘‘6th Letter on Infmtrj.” 
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4ie TIIE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OI.’ THE FUTURE. 
Retreats ‘7ttrdeler I;irc.-\Vlrichcvei- sidc is driren Lack niust f i ~ ~ .  
cuorxnously in its retreat though tlrc fai*-reacliirq power of tlrc new 
arm, and this must morc particularly bc tiic caw wlicrc the gronnd, 
ns at 3Iajuba-allo~vs tlic coxnbRtants to approach closc to each otller 
bcforc ttic figlit is decided. 
Xoriiial littack h’onnnfioiis.-As rcgards tlre csnct drill of tlic attack, 
the latest German regulations lay down no normal formation, and any 
such is absolutely prohibited from hing drawn up or practisecl, so 
far, howevcr, tlJCJ- arc tlic only nation which adopts this plan. Ol1 
this subject Colonel Slndc remarks :’ “ Tlic German idea is that tile 
young soldiar, if oiico disciplincd, ought not to bc practised in 
stereotyped form of attack which tlic rcirxing circumstances of actn81 
combat might not midcr suitablc; but that if practised to act m. 
cording to circunist:inccs hc is less likcly t o  bc hurried and confused 
wbcn called i i p u  sudtleuly to mcct tho enemy.” It secrns CeCeSSary, 
holyever, that  thc system of attack should bo laid down sufieiontl, 
to ciisurc :ill rcgirneiits being ablc to work togethcr without a hitch, 
and to guard ng:iinst.thc danger of ncw and strrmgc mcthds  and 
n-01.d~ of command being introdnccd by too zedous Commandirlg 
Officers. Thc sjsteiu should bc sufiiciexitly elastic to bc adaptcd fop 
all sorts of ground nud tho nature of thc enemy, but the principle8 
laid down must be tlrc same tliroughont an nrmg. I t  must bc re- 
membered that “ most mcu bccornc neither wiser nar more sngaciouj 
in the turmoil of battle-rather tho rercrsc. Tlic possildity, there. 
fore, of corrcctlj pcrcciving a t  thc moincxit what liieasures nud formrr. 
tions arc required during:m action sliould riot bc relic2  OIL"^ On the 
whole it looks i d h e r  as if tho Germnus w x c  trFing a dangerous ex- 
pcriment.. Nost normal formations (e.g., our own) contcniplatc tlie 
firing line advancing to within about 150 F a d s  of thc cncruy before 
tlie crisis takes p1:icc. Though it is well to lay down in thcory that 
it is necessary to get as near j-our cnemy as possible, j c t  in practice 
i t  is very unlikcly that tlie attack will bc ablc to advanco SO far till 
thc enemi-’s firc is completely subdued, cscept, perhaps: in cramped 
couiitiy, wlicrc thc distancc separating thc coulbatauts may cvcn be 
miich less. 
Tlie principlcs to lie followed, tlrcrcfore, in tlic infantry attack may 
be summed up as below:- 
Rdsrtrire‘.-(l.) Corcring fire to bo madc usc of rsniucli as 1)osdh.  
(2.) The firing line should advance as quickly as possible, con- 
sistent with arriving a t  dccisirc range without unduc fatiguc, :wd 
thcrcforc sliould not open fire till absolutely ncccssarj. 
(3.) The firing line should be as powerful as possible, consistent 
with each mau being ablc to make full usc of his rifle. The  aligli- 
men% should bo kept in each unit. 
(4.) Vollcy firing should bc the rule. 
(5 . )  Supports and reservcs must avail tlicmselves of all cover 
Lccturc at Altlershot., ISSf), p. 11. 
2 I‘ Present State of Tactical Scicnc c,” Ynjor Keim, “R.U.S.I. Joiinial,” So. 152, 
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THE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 417 
ssible, consistcnt with due support of tlic firing linc, which lattcp 
(6.) When necessary, tho impctus to  thc firing linc for a furtlicr 
drnncc must bc gi-icn by supports, in  complctc units, admnciny 
b e p l d  tlio firing linc. 
(7.) Tho advaucc of onc part of tho linc mnst bc corercci bj- firc 
from tlic otlicr. 
(8.) Flanks should bc wry carefully gnardcd. 
For thc carrying out’of thcsc principles under hot fire, crcry nnit 
m& ham a Pud nnd 3rd in command told off. As this may not Ic 
pgsiblc with groups of ciglit men, the reninins of those groups mhicli 
bavc lost thcir lcadcrs must bc trained to join ncighbouring goups. 
Tho firc mnst bc rcgulatcd bj- diistlcs, cach lcadcrand possiblc leader 
k ing  yroridcd with one. Straggling being tho grcnt cvil, Coloncl 
Hallcn’s suggestion for ‘( battlc policc” s.ccms likely to go some 11-a~- 
banrds rcmedyixig this. Their powers over individual stmgglcrs 
would. horn-crcr, linvo to bc unlimited on thc battlefield. 
maat Po considcr firc cfficicricp bcforc considcrations of coycr. 
..-- 
Genbal Coi&siotis.-Thc conditions for thc frontal attack by 
iufantry liarc so niuch altcrcd sinco tlic introduction of smokclcss 
powder and mngazinc rifles, and altcrcd for tho most pnrt to tlic 
dr:intagc of tlic dcfcncc, that a scrious frontal attack orcr cpcn 
pound, against infantry in position, uulcss cnormous superiority in 
UtiIIery is obtnincd, mill hardly lo attcniptcd in tho futurc, csccpt 
w i n s t  indiffcrcnt troops. But tlic fact must xiof bc forgotten that 
every iricrensc of power 10 fircarms also bcncfits tho nttnckcr, ns 
regards covering firc, O I I C E  he has brought to bear $re slfpcrior fo t h d  
of the encniy, nnd tho grcatcr range allo~vs grcatcr couccntmtion of 
this covcring firc on the predctcrxnincd spot. This, combined vi th  
incrcased firc disciplinc, grcatcr skill iri making use of ground, nnd 
improrcd formations, may j c t  harc uncspccted sncccsscs in storc for 
thc dctermincd attack. 
The Dejence.--Thc rcsults of tlic introduction of magazine rifles to 
the dcfcncc appcar l o  bc simply to crnpliasizc thoso produccd by 
brecchlcnders, arid furtlicr strcngthcu the front of infantry iu positioij. 
Smokcless powder also cuablcs full nsc to be madc of tho magazine, 
aud gives it tho pomr of inflictiug a maximum of daniagc in n 
minimum of titnc. Thns it is a weapon of opportunity, and to gct 
full valuc out cf i t  mngazinc firc should be used a t  any range, so long 
as tlic targct is proportionatcly large. Bu t  such firing should bc 
ccnductcd b~ rapid magazinc \dlclys, and no indcpcndcnt firc should 
be allowcd. Thns, magnrino volleys might I c  used a t  supports nut1 
rcscrves of tho attackers, d i icL showed tlieniselves in sufficicntly 
dcnsu foiination to present a good target for thc range, or at a 
battery of artillery coming into action up to 2,000 yards. But, 
nrtumlly, thc main uso of the magazinc will bc a t  short nngcs, whcn 
the crisis of the fight lias arrircd, or a t  cavalry or a rctrcating cncmj-. 
For propcr control of firc under thcsc circuxn~tanc~~,  discipline must 
bo, as it wcrc, “ instilled into the rcry limbs of thc men,” cithcr for 
thc attack or tlic dcfcnco. 
Sincc opcn gronnd will generally bc avoided by thc assailant, the 
VOL. xxxv. 2 F  
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418 TIIE TAOTIUAL OPERATIOS8 OP THE FUTURE. 
defcndcr must economizc mcn 1)s' holdiug such portions of tlic posi- 
tion vcry liglitlj-, iind place tho greater part of Ilk force on tlic flank, 
and whcro t l c  ground is broken or  crnmped and the  view not 
crtcnsiw. 
Field Fort t$cafiou. 
Sliclter-trenches and gun-corcr will bc made marc iisc of tllan 
CYcr in futuir, both by tlic attack iind dcfcnce, in tLc forrncr case 
t o  sccurc ground gnincd, or to mokc thc front cafc, so n s  to enable 
morc troops bciiig sent to tu rn  a flank. On tho dcfcxicc, l i o ~ - c ~ - ~ ~ ,  
such corer will tend to disclose the position of thC fighting liiio and 
guns, \rIiicli riiiglit otlicririsc, through sniokclcss powlcr, cqcnpe 
xioticc. Thcrcfore, tlic positions for tkcsc cntrciicLnients will l~n~,, 
to bc juilicionsly chosen, niid fi-cshlj- turned cnrtli must bc corcrc(1 
witIi turf o r  br;iiiches of trccs in ordcr to mask its positioii. 
Espr jn ien ts  havc shown t l i n t  tlic pcxictratioii of tlic IICW British 
rifle arnounts to 3G iriclics of soft wood a t  40 yards, but only about 
2 feet of cnrtli a t  1GO p d s ,  whilc 011 niccting with stones in the 
cart11 the bullet sets up and goes no furtlicr. Foreign riflcs, probni)ly, 
giT.0 similar results, and, tlicreforc, tho Lest style of  COW^ to coiistruct 
is iudicatcd by tliesc facts. Xrti1Icr;)- fire, in future;. Lcixig ulninly 
slirapricl, n, great thickness of eartlicn p:mipct is not so Iicccssnry 
is dcptli of coycr to cscopc irs searching cffccts. 1Ie:id c o ~ e r  \rill :rlso 
be sought nftcr for thc  saiiio reasoii. On the other Ii:i~id, stoc1;adW 
 nay be said to liarc beconic \rortlless, comparcd with tlic amount of 
ia1)our xlecessary in constructing thcm, ulilcss n13dc of such solid 
material as iron rails. 
JIACIIISL-GL-SS. 
.T~ifrotZrtctory.-In considering tho cBcct of theso \\-capons on the 
tactics of tl iu future, \re tincl a great lack of instances of tlicir suc- 
cessful nxid proper use i n  ciyilizcd warfnrc in thc past, tliougli the 
priiiciplc of this wcapon is 110 Ioxigc~* n novcltJ in tlic military world. 
Ou this nccoiiut it is difficult to illustmtc our tlicorics and :irguuicnts 
br quotations from records of occnrrenccs in actual war. Hence 
n widc field is 011en for s~icculntioii nnd theory. Imagination mnst b 
largely brought into play, and a modern bnttlcficld, iii its grcat 
cstciit nnd confusion, must bc pictui.cd beforc tho mind. 
Xercrtbeless, some littlc iisc iuay bc mado of the cspcrienccs of the 
~\-ai* of 1870-71, wlicrc mitrailleuses wcrc cstcnsivcly, though, 
geiiciidlj- spcnking, most incflicicntly, used on tlic side of tlic I'rcnch. 
Tho samc qixilifjing rcrrinrk will, Iio\ve~cr, :ipply to tlic Frcnch 
nrtillcry, wliicli W:LS lnckirig both in quality of matL:ricl nntl in intcl- 
ligcnt tactical handling to such nn cstcnt tlint tlicrc is scnrccly an 
instance of its succcssful or satisfnctorx c m p l o p c n t  tlrrongkont tl* 
If, then, the contrast 1)ctwecn tlic \-due of bad and good arti l ler~,  
on tlic Frcnch and German side respectively, i s  so strikiiig, d lcn  
\Val'. 
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TRE TrWTIGhL OPERATIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 419 
both sides had long been accustomed to the handling of that arm, 
\\-hy should not the contrast be equally striking between the value of 
the badly worked and inferior mitraillense, supplied to tlio troops 
only a fcm days before the mar commenced, and the machine-gun, in 
its more perfect state of development, handled by men accustomed to 
its use, and trained in  a system of tactics based on experience and 
common sense ? The German artillery tactics of 1870 mere cvolced 
from the brains of men who had fought in the war of 18G6, and had 
seen the comparative fail?re of the arm in that war; they made good 
use of this experience, and four years later the change in artillery 
tactics and its results mere indecd marrellous. Why should not 
machine-guns and their tactics change in an equally remarkable 
manncr ? 
I Xatiwe of the Neelu Brot.-In talking of machine-guns, mo assumo 
1 that the xveapous supplied to us cnn be depended on not to jamb a t  
the critical moment, and that cach WC~FOIX will be able to keep up an 
acerage fire of about 300 rounds per minute, for at  least 10 minutes, 
and n lesscr rate for a much longer period. . 
3Iachine-guns act by fire done, and constitute a, number of units of 
very mobile rifle fire (if well horsed). But, like artillery, they cannot 
use tlicir fire when in motion, though, from the greater simplicity of 
tbcir ammunition, these weapons can be brought into action more 
rapidly than artillery> and bcing less bulky and lighter, they’ are 
more indepcndent of circumstances. They can, therefore, act Kith 
great szt~7tleizrz~ssJ but tho nature of machine-gun fire adds great 
infeiisi ty to this suddenness, thus enabling the weapon to inflict a 
maximumof damage in a minimum of time. But as this fire pro- 
’ ceeds from a vcry limited number of weapons, with less range than 
field-guns, i t  is obvious that artillery, by concentrating on caeh in 
turn, can silence them or  cause their withdrawal when beyond 
,effectire range of machine-guns. I n  ranging, moreover, the latter 
stand a t  a great disadvantage as compsrcd with artillery, for  except 
on dry and sandy soil the limit of observation of fire is soon 
rcachcd. 
Comparing their fire with that of infantry, picked layers can bo 
told off to cach machine-gun, which, unlike n rifle, is fired from 
practically a fixed rcst. Thus it is evident that greater control and 
accuracy of fire is to bc expected from the machine-pns than from 
infantrj, and consequently their effective rangc mill be grcater. 
Again, the space occupied on the march, or  in line of battle, by 
machine-guns giving a, certain volume of fire, is much less thnn that 
taken up by n Imdy of infantry producing the same amount of fire. 
Yet infantry liavo a, capability of acting independently over all sorts 
of grouud on the offcnsivc which can nevcr be possessed by machine- 
guns. 
Tactics as deduced from Exporieizce.-Some idea of the futpro tactics 
of machine-guns may be gathcred, as above stated, men from the 
’ The ayengc time of thc quickcst bat tev a t  Okchnmpton in lSS9, taken from 
corning into action to thc 1Et round fired, vim 1 minute 24 seconds (Report by 
Colonel JLunlock). 
2 F 2  
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420 THE TAOTICAL OPERATIOSS OF TEIE FUTURE 
expericnccs of 1870. Tho blundcrs of tho Frcuch serve to bring into 
promincncc only tho more c~early thc fcw occasions on wliich they 
did not commit errors. Yct, C V ~ I L  with such mitraillcuscs as the. 
posscssccl, thcy produced 5 pcr ccnt. of tlic Prussian losses.’ 
We find i n  thc early battles of that war (the only bnttlcs ~ h i c ] ~  
can be profitably studicd for our  purposc) that tlic battcrics 
mitraillcuses were almost in~ariably pitted ngninst tlic Gelma:, 
artillerg a t  considemblc artillcry xxngcs. At  Wcisscmbonrg null 
Wocrtli cspecinllr, mitraillcuses are xncritioned in such positions- 
They inmriab11 drcw thc conccntixtcd firc of thc Gcrnian guns on 
theni, and were citlicr dcstrojcd 01’ compcllcd to witlidinw. This, 
thcn, is evidently tiot tlic way they should bc employed in tlic future- 
But we havc a fen- othcr instances of tlicir cmploj-nient. In  tho 
struggle about L:L Folio copsc, a t  tho battle of Gravclottc, KC rrad : 
A mitraillcnsc battery, in particular, on that high ground, com- 
manded tho north-wcst border of the copsc, whilc anothcr on tho 
sonth corner of thc lattcr swcpt tlic clcaring bctwcn it mid tlic Dois 
do Genivanr. . . . . Gcneral V. Blnmenthal w r y  speedily 
rccognizcd thc impracticability of an ait:ick upon La Folic.” Tl1c 
mitraillcuses lierc wcro evidently in the right place. They \rere 
secureci from vicw of tho German Artillery by thc trees of the Boi3 
do Gcnivaux. 
A p i n ,  on the Frcnch left, tlic Prussinn official account states:’ 
‘‘A mitraillcnsc battery appcnrs more cspcci~lly to I i n w  bccn postcd 
exactly iii prolongation of tlic Gravclottc liigli road, and to hare 
commanded it in tlic most cffcctivc manucr.” From this it is prc- 
snmablc that thc mitraillcnsc battery in qncsticin ivns to a givnt 
cstcnt rcsponsiblc for tlic disastrous ending of tho attempt of tlic 
Genncn avnlry and artillcry to dcbouch from tlic road across tlic 
&nco ra6nc. IIcrc, ngnin, tho mitrailleuses did thcir duty. The 
diffcrencc betwccn thcir action in thc nboro instances and a t  Wocrth 
lies in the fact that at  Grllvclottc thcy werc not pitted against 
artillery from tho outsct a t  long ranges, and \\*hexi tlic German 
artillcry did advauco to St. Hubert, thc niitmillcuscs caught them 
coming into action a t  a mngc most favournblc to the ncw wapon. 
There is, liowcrer, a yet moro striking example in thc attack of the 
IXth  Gcrinnn Corps artillerj a t  thc samc battle. Thc official accouut 
of it is as follows :I ‘I Tho artillery upou the spur south of tho Bois 
dc la Cnssc was a t  this t h o  in 8 vcrr precarious position. 
mitraillcusc battery had como into nction a t  thc most cffcctivo ‘range, 
opposito thc’left flank of thc Prnssian linc of guns., Tlic 4th Hcary 
Battery in that ncighbourhood, which had already snstaincci con- 
siderablo loss from infantry firc, wtis  in a f e w  niiniites so dtraiagetl Ly 
tho naifmilleiisc $re that several Officers, five gun ComniaIidcrs, and 
forty mcn wcro placcd hors de mt)ibuf, u-liilc nearly all tho horses 
TCrc killed or wounded.” The further result of this was that four 
guns fell into tlic hands of thc cnemj-. This, thcn, is a rcmarknbb 
1 
9 Part I, rol. ii, p. 29. 
Field Works,” CoIoncl IXmckcnburj, p. 13. 
Otrrcial account. 
I Ibid., p. 74. ICid., p. 29. 
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THE TICTICAL 0PER:U"I'OSS OF T-E FUTURF. 43 1 
instance of \\.hat tho mitrnillcnso could do \rhcu rin1itlr handled 
This s1iow.s it up in its propcr ~~Iuc,  as tli  torpcdo-boG of the battle- 
field. I n  a naval action a torpcdo-boat docs not foolishlq- cspose 
;h9clf nlone to tho firc of n bnttlc-ship. It is whcn tlic ntterition of 
the brttlc-ship is nlrcady engaged with another moro equal opp:)ncnt 
(or under cover of dnrkucss) that tho  torpcdo-boat finds its chance. 
Tho cnsc is somowhat similar with rii:icliinc-guns. \\'hen tho iittcn- 
tion of the cncrny's artillery is already cngngcd in tho hcat of nction, 
they may scek their opportunity, assistcd by tlic ilnduhtions of tho 
onnd, wliich may liidc thcm till tlicj opcn fire. IVo Iiavc Princc F raft's opinion,' that smnll bodies of cavalry may approach cngagcd 
jnfantry unnoticcd, nnd 110 giws scvcral instances of tlic cscitcmcnt 
wliich absorbs tho attention of troops cngagcd with nn cncmy 
f;mokelcss powlcr will doubtless still furtlicr aid tho mncliinc-guns 
in relnniriiug uoobscrrcd, even nftcr they open firc. IVhy should 
they not approach in  tlic rnniincr anticipated for cavalry, and com2 
into action a@st engaged iiifnntrj or artillery whoso flanks arc 
in6llffiClcllt~y protected ? 
From tho a b o ~ c  onsiderations, wo gatlicr tlint mnchinc-guns with 
an nrniy 011 tlic dcfcnsiw will act iu tlic following manner in thc 
battles of tlic futuro :- 
Thctics on the Dcfensice.-(l.) They will 110 stationed to srccp 
defiles, roads, command thc dcbouclics of woods nnd dcfilcs, and flank 
the points cl'nppui of tho niain line, thus  forming tlic capo&rs o j  tho  
&jeiiec, as it WXC. Wlicn csposcd to nrtilleiy a t  corisidcrablo ranges 
t h y  will not clraw that fir0 on thcmsclrcs by firing a t  wry Ioiig 
mxhinc-gun -ranges, but will rcrnain without nttrncting noticc till 
tlic npproach of tho cncrny's infantry. 
(2.) Thcrc will bo wcll-horscd n.xchinc-guns ready to dnsli out, in 
conjunction with cnralrj-, nnd tnlic ndmntngc of such an opportunity 
as was nffordcd by the IXth Corps artillery at tho bzttlc oE 
Gmrclottc. 
TO tlicso two, based on tho cspcricnco of tho Franco-Gcrmnn War, 
a third might bc nddcd x-hich has no czpcrienco to back it up, and is 
thcroforc purc tlicorr. 
(3.) A rrscrrc of well-liorscd mnchinc-guns, possibly tlic snrnc as 
tliosc mentioned in (2), miglit bc held avnilnblc for &alloping off to 
any point in Llio dcfcnco wliicli is hnrdly prcsscd. Such timely 
support .might snvc the post till tlic nrrivnl of' tlic slower moving 
infantry rcsei-ics, and on tho danger being dissipated, thc mncliinc- 
guns miglit bo withdrawn, nnd licld rcady to act in a similar way in  
anotlicr part of thc field. In  holding such II position as that of tho 
Lisninc, it  scenis likcly thnt'mneliinc-gnns miglit bc so used. At St. 
Prirat also, though tho Prcncli Guard nrrired too lnto to rcstorc tho 
battle, Initrnillcuscs might ham arrived in timc if linucllcd with 
boldness. 
Esnmplcs of tho cmplojmcnt of mncliiuc-guns by an attacking 
army wo hnrc nonc. But it scerns probnblo that tlicir action will bc 
somerrhat as folloris :- 
* " 7th L c t t x  on c3ralr~." 
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422 TflE TACTIOAL OPERATIOSS OF TIIF, FUTURE. 
bp Tactics on tiic Ofcnsire.-(l.) Tlicy will cconornizc infantry securing tlic front, in conjunction with r r t i lhT,  against c o u n h  
attack, thus enabling more troops to bc employcd in turning mops 
ments. 
(2.) Tlioy will assist artillcry in corcring .tlic adrancc of t b  
infantry to tlic attack, thus rendering long-rango corering fire 
infantry rcservcs less necessarj, for machine-gun Brc is thc trnM 
lone-rangc infantry firc. 
(3.) Tlicy’will adraucc into tho cnptnrcd position a t  tlic liccls of 
tho attnckcw, and by their stcady and controlled fire will bo inv&. 
ablc for firing on tho retreating defenders or for beating off a counter. 
attack by his reserves. At  such stages of tho battle, thp mug0 bcipg 
slio~t,  thcir firc would bc most deadly, and quickness in coming i n b  
action bcing a great dcsideratum, they ought to haw thc advantage & 
artillcry i n  this respect. 
In CZose Cotoifry.-Tlic discussion, thus far, lias l i d  rcfcrenm 
mcrely to thc use of mncliinc-guns in fairly open countrr. I t  is now 
dcsirnble to inqnirc into their rclatiro action in n closc country l i b  
England, where hedgcrows and fcnces of every description prevent 
any important rnorcmcnt of mountcd troops, exccpt by roads a d  
Iancs ; vilicrc woods and trccs in tlic hcdgcrows obstruct the vim:. a d  
mnkc long-range firing w r y  diificalt, csccpt Tvhcrc a great command 
eyer thc country exists. Any soldier who has sccn tlic p e n t  o p  
rolling slopes on most Continental battlcficlds, wlierc unrestricted 
vicw can bc obtaincd to long artillcry miigcs, and who tlicn xncntdl 
compares tliosc countries with n-hot wo usunlly scc in ~ r i g l a n l  
cannot b u t  C O I ~ C  to tho conclusion that England is essentially an 
h f a n f r y  conntiy. Wield days a t  Aldersliot naturally do not bring this 
liomc to us, for thcly tnko plncc on ground spcci:illy clioscn for aU 
arms. In fact, owing to economical considcrations, it is hardly 
possiblc to fight miniic battles over enclosrd land and realize 
properly what it mcans. Perliaps a War Game, fouglit oror s u 2  
country, may nssist us to a certain cxtciit in npprccinting its difficulties 
It shows u s  liov hard it is to mnkc proper usc of cnvalr~-, except M 
mcrc scouts and stop-gaps, and horn difiicult it is to get nrtillery into 
any position wlierc tlicy can sco bcyond infantry n n g c  suficiently 
wcll to firc viitli cKcct. No doubt many suitablc opeii spaccs and 
coznmandi~ig positions do occur about thc Uowns in thc soutli, nnd t b  
moors in tlic north, but, taking thc country as a diole, it a p p w  
that- 
(0.)  Cavalry will be largelg used to figlit dismonntcd. 
(L.) Artillcry will not oftcn find cxtcnsirc positions from which 
propcr iisc can bc mndc of its long mngc, arid crcn d i c n  t h y   art^ 
obtained thc fcnccs will provide co\-cr for an cncrny. 
(c.) Whcn guns arc onco in position it will bu difticnlt for th- 
citlier to advnncc to suppcirt an nttack or to retire-column of r o u h  
being thc only possible formation in motion. Consequently, the r o h  
would soon bcconic blockcd with n mass of guns and infantry. Them 
forc, as ;I rule, tlic greater part of thc guns would Lave to remain im 
onc position throughout nn action. 
bY 
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THE TACTIOAL OPERATIOSS OF TZIE FUTURE. 42.1 
( J . )  It would Lo v c r ~  risLry to send on artillcry in ndmncc of thc 
infantry to coxumciicc tho fight, niilcss tlic proposcd nrtillcry positions 
m-cre previously scizcd and secured from sudden attacks. This niight 
doilc by mounted infantry or dismountcd cavalry, with some 
xnachiric-guns to command the a v ~ n u e ~  of approach lcnding froni tho 
cncmy. 
Similar conditions of country might, tlicrcforc, nffcct thc tactics of 
mwhine-guns as follows:- 
(a . )  In conscquoncc of thc limited vicw of the artillery tho 
n~~clliuC-gUXlS !\-odd not h SO h b l c  to bc destroyed by tlic enexny’s 
guns at long mnges nor oqhutxl  by. cavalry. 
(b.) Owing to tho dificultr which guns would h n ~ c  in supporting an 
attack, tlic mnchinc-guns on tlic defensivc mould bnrc little to fear 
from them in tlic close nttnck. 
(c.) The chanctcristics of closo country bcing that crcry road or 
lane constitutcs n dcfilc, csccpt for cstcncled infantry. great oppor- 
tnnitics for the usc of mnchinc-guns on tho dcfcnsivo will prcscnt 
tl1cn1sclvcs. 
* (d.) Just ns nrtillci.1 and caralry arc prcvcntcd from making full 
1 USC of thcir mobility in close country, so also macbinc-guns will find 
it diflicult to get about, csccpt by rcnd. LEcnce t h y  would, for tho 
1 most part, only bc able to assist iu the attack by following up on tho 
roads the atlmntngcs gnincd by the infnntrj- in tlic ficlds, thus sccur- 
ing cncli bit of ground gaixicd. Wllerc, lion-cvcr, the cncxny’s position 
is a comm:indinq onc, they can assist the artillcry in covcring tho 
ndoancc of attacking in fnn tq -  bj- thcir firc. 
(e.) Prom tho above it follows that, in closc country, machine- 
guns nccd not bc cquippcd for moving wry rnpidly, csccpt tliosc 
which arc nttnclicd to tlic carnlrr. 
Poicer of Sitrprisc by Xachiiie-grru.-It is cvidcnt that onc great 
chnrmteristic of tlic mnehinc-gun is tlic powcr it has for getting the 
rery utmost value out of :L stcryrise of tho cnomy. Tlic introduction 
of this wcapon may bc cspccted, tkcrcforc, to affect tlic tactics of tlic 
other arms cliicfly in causing tlicm to guard against snrprisc with 
increased vigilnncc. C:rmlry is an nrm which will natuidly bc on 
the look-ont for sucli surprises, nnd, tlicrcfore, tho prcsencc or abscncc 
of liostilc machine-guns mill bc nsccrtaiuccl by thexu to tho bcst of 
thcir powcr. Sliould bodics of cavalry coxnc within rango of tlicso 
weapons, without bcing nwnrc of tlicir prcscncc, tlic pcualty tlicy will 
pay is likely to ninkc tlicm xnorc cnrcfiil in futurc. Tlic snmc may 
bc said of closod bodics of infantry, and, crcn when dcploycd, tlic 
facilities m:icliinc-gnns afford for lapid Inovcs off to (r Bank, to cnfi1:idc 
a linc, cithcr attacking or defending, will causc flariks to Lo guarded 
with cspccial wrc. I’rincc Kriif t’d instnnccs of t Iic preoccupicd 
state of hotly cnpgcd ixifnntrr and nrtillcrr tcncli 11s that such 
strokcs bj rnnchinc-guns arc to bc cxpcctcd on tlic Ixittleficlds of t l c  
future. It is, lio\vcvcr, t l c  artillcry diioli can do most lxarm to  the 
machine-gun, and which, iu tiiru, has. most to fcar from that wcapon. 
“ 7th Letter on Camlry.” 
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424 THE TXGTIOIUJ OPERATIOSS OF TEE FUTUIIE. 
CarnJry can bolt or charge, infantry can deploy or gct undcr corer, 
0x1 the arrival of suddcri shoircr of bullcts, bNt with artillery it ia 
diffcrexit. Caught on tho march, one horse shot in a team meana 
keeping, pcrliaps, a large number of guns, men, and horses nlider 
deadly mid coucentratcd fire for some minutes. If sarprised is 
action from a flank, or in coniirig into nction from closc range ill 
front (as n t  Ginvclottc), i t  rncans n largo loss in u c n  and liorscs, and 
possibly also of guus, if the machinc-gun attack is supportcd by otllcr 
:irxns. Guns cannot cliarge, and it is agrniust tho principles of artillcry 
t o  retire, crc6 if suIticicnt horses were lcft to cnablc it to do so. 
Tlicrcforc, tlic guns must be brought to  bcnr as quickly ns possiblc on 
tlic unexpcctcd : i d  possibly uiisccn foe. By tlic tixnc rffcctirc fire 
is altaincd, the greatcr part of thc pcrsonncl of the bnttcrics may bo 
stluck down. IIencc, the introduction of tho machinc-gun may 
iicccssikitc thc nddition of trnincd scouts to cncli bnttc1.y or field 
nrti11ct.F division, to look aftcr tlicir flanks in  action, while on t l l ~  
march i t  will niorc thancvcr bo advisable to hnvcsomc infantry in front 
of thc guns. llcforc coming into nction the position chosen sliould be 
tiikcn mid sccarcci in advance I'y mountcd troops witli machine-gans, 
both of which may givc plnce to infaiitry Then it comes up. 
Xachi~rc-gims acting with JIoioztcd !Proops.-It is obvious, nnll bas 
iudccd bccn rccognized in our Service, that machine-guns aKord a 
melcomc addition to the firc pOW?r of cnvali-y. 1x1 the future, \yo 
may scc bodies of mountcd troops consisting of ca~iilry, horse artillcry, 
macliinc-piis, and niourited ixifitntrj- acting the part of tho dclaying 
forco with success. lEnd thc French at Scdnn posscsscd such n forco 
and Iind it been sent to St. Jlcngcs \\-hen ncms of tlic German advance 
on that  sidcfirstarrircd, the mouth of the Falisetts dcfilc might haw 
bccn hcld loug cnougli to cnablo the Prcnch infilntry from Ploing to 
coxno up; a t  any rate, the bold adrnncc of tho Gcrnian nrtillcry 
from this dcfilc might hare had quitc a diffcrcnt result. Had 
llcnedck posscsscd such a forco a t  Koiiiggratz, i t  miglit have given 
liim thc mcans of cliccking tlio Crown l'rincc's adv;ince snfficicntly 
long to ciiablc him to deal cfieectivcly with Prince Yrcderick Charles' 
army. n'umberless similar instances of tho 1io:isiblc cmploymciit of 
sncli a forcc might bc gircn, cithcr ns rctniuing forces or for making 
raids for thc purpose of scizing important. strategicnl points. 
I n  the CoraZry Combut.-It will now be necessary to discuss what 
assistance tlicsc weapons niay give to cavalry nnd horse artillcry in 
the cn~nlry combat. It is cvidcut t l d  thcir rapid :iud intcriso fire 
Till fiud n vcry suitable targct iii L ~ ~ S S C S  of csvalq-, qnd, bcing 
csscntially n weapon of opportunity, they would appear to bc X - C ~  
deadly against t1i:it rapidly JXiOVing arm. They hare no fuzcs to 
trouble about, and the casc with wliich thc dircction of firc can bo 
altered by tlicir tmvcrsing gear, whilc actually firiug, makcs i t  
poesiblc for thcm to follow with rcndincss any latcral movomcnts of 
the liostilc cavalry ; tlio ranges in sue11 combats ~ o u l d  usually be 
suitable to machine-guns, and the cstrn hciglit of tho mountcd man 
makcs errors in mngc of less conscquencc. Yct thoy cannot displnco 
horse nrtiIlery,'for the Iattcr nrm is ucccssq-, not only to keep in 
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TLIE TACTICAL OPERATIOXS OF THE FUTURE. 425 
check tlie enemy's gnns, which might otlicrwise kecp both cavalry and 
inacliinc-guns at  a distance, but also to sliell rillagcs or slight defcxices 
which n bullet cannot penetratc. IVcro tlicre no horse Artillcry, il 
mliolo cavalry division might be cffcctively stopped by a few inen in a 
building commanding a bridgo or other dcfilc. I t  is the c o a l l i d  
action of the horso nrtillcry and machine-guns which must be sought 
for in tlic cavalry combat ; the lo~igcicranging wcapo~i distracting 
the nttention of tho enemy, and his artillery, wliilo tho otlier man- 
auvres round in co-opcmtion with tho cnvalr~. Tlicxi, masked by 
tlicir cavalry, machine-guns might approach within effective rango of 
that of tbc enemy, nnd coming into action pcrhnps unobserved, whilo 
thcir cavalry clear thcir front, a fcw liundrcd rounds might bo 
ponrcd into tho liostilc mass in a w r y  short space of tirnc, arid the 
morncnt seized by the cavalry to take advantage of tho confusion in 
the liostilc ranks and chargc. 
Tlie possibility of manwuvres of this kind ~ i l l  add to the duties of 
horse artillery, as it will now havo to attcmpt to destroy m:icliinc- 
guns of the cucmy bcforo thcy arrive witliin range, arid tho resulting 
contest opcns a largo field for speculation in tho future. 
Use with Oict~~osfs.-On tho f e z  occasions in which artillery nro 
sent on outpost duty, the gnns nrc nsnally cmplojcd to  command 
bridgcs or dcGlcs which hostilo troops must pass before making an 
attack. Witliixi cartain rangcs, mnchinc-guns ~ronld cvidcntly bo 
more suitable for the purposc, and the continnous strcnm of bullets 
mould forbid the pnssago to tlic enemy till artillcry \vcrc brought to 
bear, and thc macliiuc-guns pounded at long rangcs. Thus tlic 
object of gaining tirnc for tho army thcy protected ivould Lo 
fulfilled. 
For tlic defence of such places, or  even of opcn country, against 
night attack, thc mncliinc-gun posscsscs an attribute mliich makes it 
particularly valuable, vix., that i t  mu be Inid by daFliglit on the 
desired spot and a t  the desired range, and clamped in that position so 
that tho fire loses nothing in accuracy tlirough bcing dcliwrcd iu 
darkncss. 
Chief 1)rnicbacX.s to fheir  Vsc.--'lt will h a ~ e  appcarcd from what 
has prccedcd tliat the two. grcat drawbacks mliich machine-gnns 
suffcr from ah-(l) bcing SCCII, and tliereforc silcnccd n t  long rango 
by artillery ; (2) the difficultj- of ranging. Tlic first of tlrcse is evi- 
dcntlp considcrablr rnodificd by tho uso of smokeless powdcr, and 
another reccnt durelopmcnt of science-tho ixngc-finder-mill, it is 
espcctcd, largelj- rcducc tho second. Itangc-finders rnny now bc con- 
s i d e d  to hare passed the erperimcntal stagc, nncl to haro really 
become a factor in mrfarc  to bo rcckoncd on, morc cspccially for 
machine-guns. 
Conrlusiou.--Tn conclusion, \vc submit that though machinc-guns 
scem destined to play n girat  part in future mars, j-et they \rill not 
abate l y  one jot the importancc of artillery. The raison d'6h-e of 
artillery is to silence that of the encmg, and then prcporc tlio "ray for 
tho infantry attack1 by bcatiiig down and dcmoralizing that arm of 
tlic defenders, which, owing to magazino rifles, is now moro impos- 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
5:5
3 2
2 J
un
e 2
01
6 
426 THE TAOTIOAL 0PER~~TIOX.S OF THE FUTURE. 
siblo tlian cycr to approach, if intact. If, thcrcfore, tho artillci*j- is 
not strong onough to silcncc tho opposing artillery, either the attack 
will fail 01’ it caIlllot bo attcmptcd, and tho offcnsivo will fall to t1lQ 
cudmy. It is thcrcforc absolutely ncccssary t h t  tho artillcry bc not 
reduccd by a siiiglc gun, so thnt machinc-&ns niay step in. . 
QUICK-FIRISG Guss.
Defiiiitioa.4y quick-tiring guns arc uudcrstood tliosc machine- 
guns of wliicli tlio calibre is grcatcr than that laid down by the 
Gcncvn Convention as tlic limit for crplosiyo projectiles, i . ~ . ,  tliose 
projccting shclls of about 1 lb. weight and upwards. 
Such weapons arc mouutcd on non-recoil carriages, and mhcn the 
calibre of thc g u n  is so great as to cnuso its field-carriage to recoil, 
it must. bc rclaid for every shot., and bccomcs practically a field 
artillery weapon and a single-loader. 3lr. Wordcnfclt says’ that tho 
heaviest quick-firing gun hc can make, of yhich tho recoil is ab- 
sorbed by arrangements in tho field-carriage, is n 7.7-pr. ‘l’hcrc is 
thus a considcrnblc dzercncc in tho porvcrof its slicll and that of our 
12-pr. 
Argioneirfs for and agaiiist fheir htrodticfion.-To put tho question of 
the introduction of tlicso weapons into a field army, as nrtillcry, in 0;s 
simple a manncr ns possible, tlic argnmcnts on both sidcs are gircn 
below, so that thc raluc of both may be compared :- 
Arpnienfs  for their Introduc- 
lion. 
(a.) Tho fact of liat-ing. non- 
rccoil cnrriames,. metal cartndgcs, 
and percussion locks, produccs 
greatly augrncnted mpidity of 
firc compared with field p i s .  
(b.) The onormous dcstrnctivc 
and m o d  ‘cffccts of tho rapid 
projcction of a numbcr of sliclls 
on an cncmy. The firc, it is said, 
cau bc continned for a numbcr of 
rounds without rclayiiig, and p t  
haye suflicient accuracy. 
4 
(c.) Greater lightness of tho 
gun as compared with tho field 
gun. 
i - g i i n t e n t s  against their IJitrodtrc- 
tion. 
A. Firc cfect depends onwcight 
of shell as me11 as rapidity of 
firc, and it is argued tlint one good 
12-pr. shmpncl 3\41. liarc morc 
effect tlian ninny of much smaller 
colibrc and billlet capacity. 
u. Tliougli tlcorcticdly it is 
uiincccssary to lay tlic quick-firer 
for every round, yct, practically, 
this is not truc. XI.. Nordcnfclt* 
ncknodcdgcs tliat his 77-pr. has 
to be laid for ercryrouncl at long 
xxnges, and cycn a t  rery short 
ranges, tho accuracy is not great 
when not relaid. 
c. Thc weight of the carriagc 
and con-recoil nrrangemcnts havo 
to be so great that thc total w i g h t  
of gun and carriage is brought up 
to  that of thc 12-pr. and carriagc. 
“ Quick-firing Gun3 in thc Ficld,” “ H.U.S.1. Journal,” rol. xuii.  
ICid., p. 23. 
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THE TXCTICAb OPERATLOSS OF THE FUTURE. 42 ‘i 
This is prorcd in Captain 
hlaudrj’s work.’ 
1). Tho quick-fircryould really 
require as many men as tho field 
gun, for tho duties to be per- 
formed aru vcr j  similar, and 
losses l i n ~ c  to bc provided ngainst. 
The numbcr of men a t  tho guri 
with the 12-pr. is oirlr four, in- 
clnsivc of tho gunncr bringing 
nmmunition from tho men a t  the 
limber, while hlr. Nordcnfelt 
rcckons tho same numbcr as re- 
quired nt his gnn. 
(d.)  Economy in men required 
to work tho gun. 
(e.) Capability, owing to non- 
recoil, of bcing firod from mncli 
stecpcr rcrcrso SlOpCS than field 
guns. 
Thus all tlic nrgumcnts in favour of tho quick-firer cxccpt (e) arc 
I n  addition, thcrc arc tho following objections to them :- 
E. A:,.ninst ciirtliworks 019 buildings tlic 12-pr. common slicll should 
F. Wastc of nmmunition likely to bc caused by the quickfirer. This, 
a. Dificulty of observing bursts of such small shcll. 
11. If introduced in addition to thc 12-pr. it means complication of 
ammunition. 
I. Inferiority of quick-firer nt long ranges as compared with a ficld 
gun. 
E. The timc taken to set fuzcs prcwnts any rcry great rapidity of 
of fire being attained. 
Co)icZusio,is.-Thiis tlic w i g h t  of argumcnt appcars to be against 
tho quick-firer, for IL field army. A firearm in tilo field must project 
either the smallest projectilo capqblc of killing n, man (liko riflcs and 
machinc-guns), or its projectilc must bo as large and powerful as 
possible, consistent with mobility, in order to producu the grcatcst 
possible cffcct, be it man-killing or  battering. 
Yet tho principle of quick-firing guns ~iiust not bc thrown aside. 
Rapidity of fire at critical niomcnts is of T-ital ixnportancc if  accurate, 
and thirty shells bursting over a given arc3 oecupicd by troops, in f i ~ c  
minutes, would produce au infiiiitely greater effect than tlic snmc 
numbcr spread owr t m n t y  minntcs. The clcsfrztcfice cffcct produced 
varies directly as the quantity of slicll shoiwrcd on tlio nren in qucs- 
tion, but the arorat cffcct iii:~y Lc said to vary invcrsclj- as tlie length 
of timc during which thcsc sliclls arrire. Tlic rcason for this is 
simply that thc men hnvc not timc to recovcr froxn tho shock pro- 
duced on their nerves 1)s sccing onc cflectim shcll, bcforc mother, 
equally dcstrnctivc in its effects, arrives on tho scene; and this in- 
crcnses as it goes on. Therefore KC must seek to augment tho 
rapidity with which field-guns can bc fired. Tlieorcticallj, no more 
auswcrcd on tlic othcr sidc. 
have dccideclly tho best of it.. 
howcv~r, miglit bc rcmedicd by fire discipline. 
‘ I  Quick-firing Guns for Land Service,” “B.A.I. Journnl,” 3899. 
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42 3 THE TAUTIUIL OPERATIOSS OF TIIE FUTURE. 
nmmunition will bo rcquired, as a greater cffcct will bo prodoccd in 
a sliortcr timc by B given nnmbcr of rounds. Pmcticnlly, howorcr, 
6omc iucrcnso of ammunition will bo ncccss:iiy, but tliis qucstion is 
diacussed elsewhero. 
Stops hnvc bccn taken in tlic direction of incrcnscd rapidity of fire 
by the introduction of nrrangcmcnts for chcckiug tho rccoil of ficld- 
guns. By this mcans, also, p u s  will bo nblo to como into notion on 
stcopcr rcvcrse slopes than a t  prcscnt. Shclls will, in  futurc, l o  
cnrricd into actian rcndj-fuzcd, and fuzes will bc capablc of more rapid 
setting. It is probable also, that slicll and cartridgc may bo fitted 
togcthcr in brass cases and fircd by.pcrcussion locks, but this. mcnw 
an incrcaso of weight, for tho cartridgo cnscs ncccssnry for tliis would 
n-cigli at lcnst 9 Ibs. cadi for tho 12-pr. An iniprovcd system for 
suppljing ammunition from the limbers and wagons will nlso tciid 
towards tlic dcsired rapidity of firc at critical moments. 
By mcnns siicli as the nborc, ouco tho opposing nrtillcry got within 
dccisivo imgc, thcy will scttlo which is to Lc tho victor in a shortcr 
spaco of timc, nud tho victors will be able to pay increased nttcntion 
-now so ncccssnry-to tho opposing infantry. 
Ilorsc ArfiZlery.-Tlic qucstion of supplying quick-firing guns to 
tho Lorso artillery battcrics with tlic cavalry division, is not opcn to 
quitc such grnro objcctions ns in tho case of ficld Inttcrica. Horsc 
artillcry frcqucntly iiavo to firc ;r fen- shclls ~ c r j  rapidly and tlicn 
limbcr up. They liave seldom to rcmain in action for very long, 
nulcss plnccd in line of battlc with otlicr gurs, but probably in  this 
case, as a t  Nars-la-Tour, t h y  \vould bo bcttcr employed with carnlry 
on tbc flanks. At  tho samo timc, guns with the carnlry division 
must havc sufficicnt wcightof shcll to dislodgc an ciicmy fisoxn n housc 
hastily prcIxtrcd for dcfcncc. Tliercforc, if a suitnblo non-recoil 
carriago can be constructcd for a 7- or 8-pr., of suflicicnt Iightncss to 
bc used as liorsc artillery, it is probable that thc bnlnncc of advantngo 
would lie in tlio substitution of such a w q o n  for thc Iircscnt l2-pr., 
though sonic disndvautngo miglit occasionally t o  sufI'ercd from an 
cncrny with a licnricr projcctilc. 
Thc other nltcrnativo is to substitntc a lighter 12-pr. gun with 
1,500 fcct muzzlc-wlocitj- Tho carriage rcquircd for snch D gnn 
would bo much lighter than tho prcscnt ow, and tho rccoil not so 
grcat. It appears n, qucstion of wciglit behind tlio teanl, and uon- 
recoil Z'CYSIM calibrc; but if n liglit 12-pr. mil cnrringc cnn l o  con- 
structcd SO that tliis total wciglit docs not escccd 59 cwt. pcr liorso 
with limbcr packcd and with Rmdl recoil, thcn 11-o prcfcr sncli an  
armamcnt to a rcdnction in  calibre, proridcd that tlio ammunition bc 
mado up in n similar ~ a j  to that of tho quick-firing gnu. 
HIGHER TACTIC:'. 
The Ofcnsi~'e.--" Thcory onxlooks tho fact that nndcr nornal con- 
ditions it is uncommonly difficult oren to initiate an infantrj  attack, 
qnitc irrcspcctivo of carrying it through, as long as any important 
portion of thc cnonifs artillerr rcmains cffcctivc. . . . Considering 
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THE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS Ok’ THE FUTURE. 429 
the cxtraorilinary precision of modcrn artillcry fire ns compared 
~ t h  that in-pnst wars, an infantry attack which has tq work its way 
through artillcry firc in its princi n1 phases lias no prospect of 
tically tho CZSC, and slirnpncl firc was unknown then. It is cvidcnt, 
thcrcfore, that artillcry has further dcrclopcd its importance, and 
that sidc on nliich tlic artillcry (in ordinary country) provcs thu 
stronger will d o n c  bc nbh to take thc offensive. A great dcvdop- 
mcnt of coceririg fire is to bc sought for and expected, once thc 
artillcry ducl is over, in ordcr to cnablc the infantry to movo forviarcl 
to thc attack with thc lcnst possible loss, and this corcring fire will 
mainly furnishcd by nrtillery and machine-guns, and probiibly by 
infantry rcscrrcs, wlicu they can do so from a flank. Artillcry and 
machinc-guns must, howcvcr, firo over tho hcads of tlicir infnntT, 
and those troops which cannot stand this arc usclcss for thc attack. 
Neitlier 
the action of successirc lincs nor the mcchnnical pressurc of rcservcs 
will cvcr sufficc, in tlic battlc of the futurc, to secure sncccss for tho 
assailant. Reserves must act indcpendcntly to threaten tho flank o r  
Iinc of retreat, 01’ wherc they would haro a stratcgic cffcct on the 
whole situation.”’ Such wero thc tactics carriccl out a t  tho late 
Frcnch manmuvrcs a t  Cnmbrai: and in thc American Civil War, by 
Shcrrnnu against Johnston in Georgia. Tho chnractcristic of these 
tactics is the widc turning movcmcnt, and by this means the strength 
of tho frontal ilcfcxicc cnn best bo madc use of by tlic offcnsiro army. 
A smaller forcc than formcrlj- can now bc lcft to hold tho front, and 
the co-opcration of tho dit-idcd forces can be bctter sccurcd in theso 
days of field tclcgmplis than nscd to bc tho cnsc. 
17ic Dejeferzsit.e.-Just, ns continuons lincs in pcrmancnt fortification 
liavo givcn w a ~  to detached forts, with the improvement in weapons, 
so, i n  t a c t i d  battles of the future, dcfensiblc localities at intervals 
may tako tlio place of continuous liues of dcfcncc, thc intcrrals bcing 
lcft to artillery. Thus the dcfcnsive line will stretch so far that the 
envclopiug attack sp.tcmirill bccomo 8 matter of grcat difficulty. But 
this cannot go on for cvcr, and thcrcforc certain weak points of tho 
linc bcirig clctcctcd, h’npolcon’s plan of brcaking in at  the ccntro may 
ngain bc illustrntcd in tlic future. This is tlic more probable bccauso 
of thc longer distance tho defenders’ reserws may havc to march, 
and cxpcricncc does not tell us that thchardest prcsscd point is easily 
rccognizcd and rcinforccd. 
The Affack-Von dcr Goltz draws tho following 
conclusions on this subject, a t  a time when magnzinc rifles, though 
contemplated, wero not introduced: “Whilst up to this timc it has 
been customary for fivp or s i s  army corps to occupy tho encmy in 
front, whilst auothcr corps thrcw itself upon his flank nnd proved 
suEcicnt for tlic purposc, this proportion Fi l l  perhaps bc rcrcrsed iu 
future.” Without going so far as this, it secxns l i k c l ~  that in  an 
1 Major Iieim, “R.U.S.I. Journal,” KO. 152, p. GLI. 
f Ibid., p.!2‘3. 
a Timw, Scpternbcr 16tb, 1600. 
s ~ c ~ ~ s s . ” l  Even iii tlic war of 1870, k Iajor Kcim says, this was p~*ac- 
Over opcn ground, tho aborc-quoted autliority rcmnriis : 
Lines of 1.uftZe. 
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430 THE TACTIUAL OPERATIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 
nrniy of, finy, three army corps, onc of them might, ou fn-rournblo 
grouiid, occupy tlic cntirc front, viliilo tlic rcmnining two-mnskcd lIy 
cavalry-nttnckccl the enemy's flank or f f n n k ~ ,  OX or  both, according 
t o  tho . tactical nud str:ifcgicnI necessities of tho sitintion. TIlo 
cnvnlry veil covcriug t h c  stmtcgicnl ndrnucc Kill h a ~ e  i t s  counterpart, 
on the .bnttlcficld iii tlic lirclimiiiary stngcs, nnd bodics of cavalry and 
irifnntry n i t l i  mncliixic-giins will spread out  ant1 occupy dcfcnsivc 
positions o ~ c r  tliu whole front, oiicc t h e  cncrny is  nsccrtniiicd to  bc in 
force too grcnt  f!r 'the nd-rnncc-gnnrd to srrccp nway. Under coyer 
of th i s  vcil, tlic troops for  thc  nttnck will bc conccytrntcd in the 
ncccssary directions, rind tho cncmy nirist be fnllcn on both front and 
flnnks siinultnncously, tliougli no t  xicccssnrily in  cqual forco in both 
clircctions. 
The Dtfcircc.-As rcgnrds tho dcfcxicc of a positiou, the  distributiou 
of troops cannot bu t  lic much clinngcd. 0 1 1  favournblc gxaiiiid, the  
f ront  will bc cnpnblc of bcing'licld by smaller xiuiiibcrs, axit1 will leave 
Inrgcr rcscrvcs n-rnilnblc t o  COVCY tlie fliinks. This will Iic doxlc, 
prob:ibly, by mcnns of l n q c  dctnchccl boclics at  distnnccs Tarying 
froiii 2,000 t o  4,000 yards on tliu riglit axid lcft rcnr of tho main linc, 
coiimctccl, if nccessary, by tc lcgrxpl  with Iicntlqnnrtcrs. Tlicso 
dctnclcd bodics should be ~CnKlr to  fnll, by ordcr of the  Commniidcr. 
in-Chief, on nriy forcc making n flank nttnck on the mnip linc, just as, 
at St .  l'rivnt, n siniilnr dctnchcd forcc might haw fnllcu 0x1 the 
Gonrds nnd Snzons when broiiglit t o  n tcrnpornry stnnrlstill. 
Wlictlirr tlicsc dctnchcd bodics will be diSCO\-CiL?d by the nttnckcrs in 
tirric will dcpcntl largely ou thc rclntivc strcngtli nnd haridling of thc 
opposing cavalry, wbicli arm will, 011 tlic Ilnxiks of tlic b:tttlcficld, 
hnvc thus  most important work t o  do. TI10 dcfcnsivo linc of battle 
of tlircc a r m y  corps may, tlicrcforc, bc somewhat :IS rcprcscntcd 
below. 
IAR>lY CCXPS I ARMY CORPS 
Thc s:inic principles might  bc followcd if divisions or  smallor bodics 
wcrc substitntcd for n rmr  corps. 
S:ilicnt positions wliicli c m  be cnvclopctl, likc Ecdnn, will be moro 
ditlicult to hold than e-icr, as t h e  conceiitratioxi of firc duc to  in- 
crcascrl rnngu has bccomo cnsicr to  bring nboiit, nud i t s  clfccts arc 
grmtcr .  
Somc dcwloprucnt in  thc  tactics of tlic rlcfcncc inny also be cspcctcd 
in tliu dircction of firlse posi t ions.  Thnt  is to  say, n fnlsu positiou may 
I c  tnkcii up l ~ y  n ccrlniri lii.oliortion of thc army-the ground bcing 
suitable-wliilc t h c  main position is witliiii cffcctirc range of i t  in 
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THE TACTIOAII OPERATIOM OF THE FUTURE. 431 
tcus. The object of tlic front position would be to cansc tlic nttackcr 
to nlnkc his dispositions for aud commit hiriisclf to attaching it as 
thollgh it \wro thc rcal linc of dcfcncc, and tho aim of the clcfcndcr 
aould bo to rctirc from it nftcr sufiicicnt rcsistance, so ns to C ~ U S C  tlic 
Attncking troops, both frontal and outflanking, to Iiccomc masscd 
together in fancied S ~ C C C S S  and considerable confusion within cflectivc 
mngc of the xiiniii dcfcnsirc linc. Tlic dcfclidcr would tlicii bc in n 
position to ninlic tlic riiost of this state of th ing ,  and probably tnkc 
tile offcnsivc in his turn, Such n-ero tho tactics of Bakcr Pasha at 
~~~shkcsse i i ,  and tlicj sncccedcd to pcrfcctioii, though his inferiority 
of forcc prcvciitccl his rcsuming the offcnsirc. 
Itcfrenfs a ~ t l  Piirmifs.-'l'lic dcfcatcd army, if driwxi off thc ficld 
l;cforc riiglitfall, will probably, owing to thc far-reaching cffcct of 
niotlcrli fire, be routcd,*arid its only clinnce of finfcty will bc undcr .co-rcr 
of tlic dnrkncss,proridcd its rrsistnnccbc stubborxi cnougli to cniisc it to 
usc iip all rcscr'ves. I n  close coptry,  Iio~vc~cr, n few dctcrniiiied mcn 
could stop tho pursuit for n timo by holding roads in  psitious whencc 
thcy c:uinot ~ w l l  bc oustcrl by artillery fire. I i i  o p n  coiiiitry, their 
flniiks being cxposcd, much morc organized resistance tlinri this will 
bc. Iicccssary to clicck the Inmuit, and compnriitivcly frcsli troops 
must Lc nciilnblc to act as :an cflicicnt rcnrgunrtl. Tlic prcscnt dc- 
ceiitralizccl fighting fornintion of troops docs not adriiit of nicn, oncc 
bentcii, bcing rallictl to tlic snmc extciit n s  was formcrly tlic casc, moro 
cspecinlly as units aro now EO liablc. to Lccomc mixed. 
Aright Opr"aiioris.-Tkc necessity for runking prcpnrations for 
attack nnknowu to an cncmy will oftcn cnusc tlicsc prcpariitions to 
bc cnrricd out by rncans of night ninrclics, so tliat all may bc rcndy 
for tlic onslaught at dawn. Attacks 0x1 n largc scalc madc during 
thc night, in order to gain immunity from tlic clicmy's tirc, arc 
scarcc1~- likcly to be attcmptcd, as tho confusion caused among tiic 
attackers tlicnisclves would bc sncli as no staff arrangernents could 
prcvciit, :uid at night men arc rcry liablc to pniiic. Xiglit attacks 
may, Iiorrcvcr, bc mndc on farourable ground and against a cnrclcss 
cncmy LJ- small l).odie's whcn no conibination marches arc ncccssnrr, 
but 2igkt nights must be choscnbotli for tliisand for uiglit rnnrchcs, for 
it is thcu much cnsicr to sco friends and thus avoid confusioii, wliilc a t  
thc ,wine tirnc thc foe is out of rangc of vision. Xiglits when clouds 
obscurc the inooii would probablq- bc bcst, for therc will  be no reflcc- 
tiou firom glittering RPIIIS, and a t  thc snnic timc it \rill bo dnrk 
cnougli t o  prcvciit nn ene~ny sccing ovcr tlic sights of his gun or 
rifle. Those wlio liarc . donc :ins- night shooting \vcll know liow 
irupossiblc i t  is to hit any largc object, cvcn twcritx yards away, 
without white pnpcr o r  luminous p i n t  on the forcsiglit.. Open 
ground, over which i t  would bc impossible to ndvnncc in fncc of an 
encriiy by day, xii:~y bc occupied by night arid trenches dug to 
sccura it, much aftcr tlic fashion of opcniug tlic first praIlcI a t  a 
sicgc. 
bylusncc o j  Groiiad.-It is probiiblc that the naturc of tlic tcrraiu 
will Iiaw n Iargcly iiicrcascd iriflnencc iii thc futurc. Stecp slopes, 
so long as they ;ire not stccp cnough to form a serious obstaclc to tho 
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attack, will probably be n ~ O U ~ C O  of weakness to the defence, more 
especially i f  thc attackers hnvo good artillcry positions within 
cffectirc range. Tho crest defines exactly the liric of dcfcnce, aria 
such slopes afford tho best opportunities for dcvcloping tho covering 
firc of tho assai1:int. 
Broken ground in front of s position will be more n source of weakk. 
ness than cvcr, for impraved methods of firo disciplinc and eoiitrol, 
and increased training of men for working owr such ground will 
enable tho attwkci. to make more and better usc of it t1i:in formerly, 
when men untrained in such warfarc soon becamc a disorganized 
mass. 
Folds of tho ground and woods, &c., aro to kc ~ouglit  after by both 
sides and by all arms, to hide supports, reser-res, artillerpwagons, and 
limbers, and bodies of cavalry, a11 of which hare no longer any 
smolic to hide thcni from ricw. Such nndulntions not only girc shelter 
from firc as before, but a t  closo rangcs tlic tmjectory of modem 
weapons is so flat that the ground is actuallg less thorouglily searched 
than in  the past. 
Villago fighting is not likely to bo affected in  any appreciable 
degrec by thc improrement in rifles. 
Tho corrcct use of ground is tliercfoir, s most important part of 
the soldier’s training. J u s t  as, a t  Jcnn, tho Prussinns, trained after 
tho method of Frederick the Grcat to fight only in thc open, were 
beaten by tlic French, accustomed to adapt tliemsclres to auy grourid, 
so in the future, the troops who can rxiakc tho best use of tlic ground 
\\-ill haro gone n long waj- towards securing tho victory. 
Thus, conditions of terrain ~ 4 1  hsvc an angmented erect on tlic 
battle of thc fnture, and wliilo a strong position will be more difficult, 
n weak 0110 mar bccome moro easy to tnkc. 
Rear-Gaards and dd~aiice-Gunr(ls.-Tt Ins been 6eeli that tho diffi- 
culty of dctcrmining the strength and position of nn encmy is now 
greater than formerl1, and this ought to mnkc rear-guard actions 
more easy to carry out. Tho enemy, unable.to discorcr tlio sfreiigtli 
and position of the rcar-gnnrd, will be moro cautious, and he will know 
that ambushes for the rash arc moro easy t3  bring about. On tho 
other Iiand, an advance-guard tnking tlic offensire may frequently 
get inrolvcd in more serious fights tliau w r o  bargained for. Tho 
risk, howerer, must bc run up to :t certain point and must bo treated 
in thc light of a reconnaissancc in force in relation to tho zwin army. 
This dutj, howerer, does not necessitnte advance-guards consisting 
of one-third of thc wholo forco as in 1870. Such can only commit 
the army to  premature battle. ‘‘ If an adrancc-gnard is large enough 
to gain timo to tho marching body to form up on suitablo ground 
before attacked, it possesscs all . the strength ncccssarj.”l Tho 
distance bctwecn the advaiicc-guard and the head of the main body 
seems likely to increase rather tlinri diminish, sinee, on mccting an 
enemy, more tinie is given to the Commander to concentlate tlic troops 
of the main body in any des i id  direction beforc arriving on thc bottlc- 
field. 
1 Article on ‘ I  Knr,” “Encrloprrilia Britannica.” 
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&-{ai?ihg Forces.-Pcrhap9 ouo of the most Rtriliing features in 
@tics with modern fircarms is theincreased po\vcr of resi3tanco given 
to inferior numbers when opposed to largo forces. Baker could never 
haye llcld thc heights of Tmhkesscn with 2,700 men against 30,000 
in tho old muzzle-loading days. Breech-loaders g a ~ e  him tho power 
to do so, and the latest improvements in weapons will still further 
incrcnsc this power. This would appear to make alternate blows at 
forces, after tho fashion of the great ‘n’apoleon, still more 
p s i b l c  in tho future than in the past, tho rehining force now 
baying in a still grcatdr degree tho power to carry out its functions. 
On the other hnnd, liowcvci*, the same argument tells us that the 
beating-of the enemy’s other army by the main forces may take a 
longer tirnc. The truth, therefore, appears to be that mhero rt retain- 
ing force is necessary, the one counteracts tho otlier, and plxes  the 
mnditions mnch as they were. But whero distaricc alono is relied on 
to prevent tho two allied armies from combining, that  distanco will 
now havc to be giratcr in order to givc time to the concentrated 
opponent to carry out his object. 
Crossing liicers.-Owing to tlic longer rangc and concentrative 
power of modern weapons, this operation mar be carried out undcl. 
moro fayonrablo conditions than formerly. Tho ground being farour- 
able, the whole neighlourhood of the intended crossing can bc swopt 
bj- firc till tho landing is cffcctcd. The samo holds good for n land- 
ing on n hostile shore of tho sea. On the other hand, however, tho 
dcfcnder by retiring out of range OE tho ships or forces on the oppo- 
sito shorc of n broad river, can bring n wider and more effective circlp 
of fir0 to bear on the first party which lands. Tho tcndencj-, there- 
fore, appears to Bc towards crossings and landings being carried out 
owr R wider front than formerly. 
JIarclres.-On account of the di5culty nnd loss of time attending 
tho movement of largo forces to a flank when near tlic battledcld, 
endearours will bo made to armngo all marches so that the army 
may bo in tho most favournble position for carrying out modern 
tactics on the battlefield with tlic smallest amount of alteration of 
plans. Envelopment being now most sought for, and, most to be 
guarded against, the tendency on both sides will be to make tho flank 
marching columns a t  least as strong and probably stronger than thoso 
in thc centre, and thus allow the normal battle order to 1)o formed 
with the lcnst amount of friction. Thus an army of fiv0 army corps 
or dvo divisions marching by threo rods might plncc two on each of 
the flank roads and oix in the centre. Two armr corps of threo 
divisions each, marching by four roads, might hnvc two divisions on 
each flank road, nnd on0 on each of the centre roads with the corps 
artillerr. I n  1870 thie system was not carried out By tho Germans, 
8Ud the tendencywas to make the centre column thc stronger on the 
march as in battle. 
The samo reasoning tells m that “supporting distance” between 
colamns has bccomo n moro elastio term, and columns may march 
further apart, whero roads suit, than in the past. Thus tho front of 
a n  army will be more extended, and tho amount of country overrun 
VOL. XXW. 2 0  
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a 4  TIIE TACTICAL OPERATIOXS OF THE FUTURE. 
and arailablc 'for rcqniitions will bc gimtcr. This, means incrcmed 
york for the cavalry scrcen, and tlicrcforc it is, to say tlio lcat,', 
premature to think of rcdncing tlie proportion of t l in t  aim. 
Coiiclzcsion.-l?oi* such opcrations as are sketched above, a higlt 
sbndard of training is still morc dcsirablc than formcrlg, nnd, except 
for passire defbncc,'armies cannot be raised to the rcqnired standard, 
by a fcm months' drill. Rcscrves soon forget their training and lose 
their 'marching power, thus swamping tho efficicncF of thoso still 
serving wit11 the coloiirs ~ l i c n  war brcaks out. Yet rcscrrcs arc ;t 
necessity, and thosc soldiers whose pcriod of scryice with tbc colours 
is ~bngcst ii.o'(otker things being equal) lcast likely to bccornc in- 
cflicient. 
Officcrs of all p n k s  liave moro rcsponsibility thrusi, on thcm, and 
];avo to think and act by thcmsclvcs for tlio gcncral good morc than 
ever. Staff 05cers, in  pafticulqr, rcquirc to bc more highlj- trained 
in  their work in ordei*to malio it possible to carry out such delicate 
operations as  night 'marches and 'tho rarions combinations nborc fore- 
sliadowed. All, this lecids us to imagine that the smallcr highly- 
trained forco'will bc able to beat thoso larger masses of men whoso 
training and discipline 1iavc bccomc rusty, in thc futnrc as in the 
past. 
. Discipline is more than ever esscntinl wlicrc so much'frecdom is 
$iven to indi~dnals ,  but this disciplinc must suit tlic chnractcr of the 
nation. TLus;:thc ,blindly obcdicnt' Russian soldicr niid thc stolid 
German must' evidently require clisciplinc of o diffcrcut sort to the 
moro indcpcndent-mindcd Anglo-Saxon; 
. Decentralizatiou must bc tho watchmord'in fire discipline, ammuni- 
tion snpplr, and"staff arrangements. The wholo orgqniratiou and 
tactics of an army dcpcnd. for success on the highcst training it is 
possiblo to girc to human beings, and tho $rmy to mhicli it is given 
wields indecd an cnormous powcr. "IiLiko R modcrn racchorsc, how- 
evci; whoso powers rcquire tho constant 'caro of tho trainer to kccp 
them in n statc of dcvclopmcnt,, an army ,lvill 'lose half its' might 
unless c a r d  .for and directed in  ,its' yo~x  by tlic Iiigbl~-traiucd 
Gcncral and his iubordinatcs. The differcncc ,bctwccn tliu tnincd 
army and tho mob i s 'nor ,  pcrlmps, TFidcr than cver;nnd crcry im- 
provemcnt i n  weapons rcqnires 'more -and 'morc training to dcvelop 
the new power placed in men's hands. 
AMMUSITIOX SL'PPLT ASD .TRASSPORT. 
Supply of Infantry Antnuridtion. 
Necessity for Aniplc Szippty.--It is not neccssary to enlarge on the 
absolute ncccssity for an ample supply of ammunition being cnsurcd 
to the soldier on tlic battlefield. That is sufficiently obvious to nll. 
Ordy second to it in iruporfancc is tho qncstion of ~cplcnishing that 
supply after the battlc is over. Uazaine' states tliat it ivas owing to 
the deficiencyof the Frcncli in the latter respect that 110 did not- 
Pro& Bnzainc. 
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TIIE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS UP TIIE FUTURE. 
+nc\s-. his’ attack on tho c s h i ~ u ~ t ~ d  Germans a t  JLars-ln-Tour 011 
August 17th, 1870. Even by tlic 18th, tliv French G t l i  Corps Iiad 
IIOt, according to Wrench nccounts, refilled their pouclics siricc tho 
battle trro days previous.’ Should these allegations bc true, :md wc 
bare no reason to doubt thom, CL great part of thc rcsponsibility for  
the disasters which bcfcll tho Frcncli rests on this failure of their 
amniunition supply sj-stcm. Tlius tho question resolves itself into 
tlco headings :- 
435 
(1.) Supply fop n, battle. 
(2.) Additional snpply availnblc for tho following day. 
Dealing with these in turn, let ns consider what number of rounds 
is necessary for thc infantT soldicr in action; 
I3rpe)iditzcre in Zats IPars.-Examining the qucstion by the liclit of 
previous cxpcricncc of tlic results of improvcmcnts in fircarms, rx 
find that., in 18GG, tlic Austrian cxpcnditurc was sist j-fow rocnds 
pcr r i b  in l3olicmia. 
Thc cxpcnditurc of thc I’russians in thc sarnc campaign with thc 
breech-loader was only scvcu rounds per riflc.’ This is ;I remarkablc 
fact, crcii though it bc discounted by tlic Iargc amount of nmmuni- 
tion probably tlirowii away during tho Austrinn retreats. Yet i t  is 
evident, if there Lo any truth in these Ggurcs, that  tlic possession of n, 
rapid-firing wc:ipon by thc Prussians did not iucrease the ammnni- 
tion cspcndilnrc on thc arercrge of f k c  crriiipaigir. Thercforc, any l a r p  
bicrease Of fhs stores of aniniiinition at the Lase ant2 parks f a r  i ~ t  rear 
of the nmiy  m m s  mneccssaiy. 
Ezyelulitrtre on tlic Battlefield. - But IVC cannot found any 
argumcnfs for settling ’ thc amount to Lo rrvailablc per soldier 011 
tlic battlcfield on tho arerage crpendiinrc, eitlicr in n cainpnim 
or in  ‘a bittlc. T L ~  only guide which can be made nsc of Ps 
tho masimum amount cspcndcd by small bodics on thc bnttlc- 
field. It is stated that nt Skalitz and Tratcnnu? some of thc 
Pmssian companies expended 80 to 100 rounds per man. A t  St, 
Prirat  tho Frcnch fircd arq- all thcir ammunition, nominally ninety 
rounds per man, but, as prci-ionsly remarked, tho corps Iiolding thnt 
p r t  of tho position had not full ponckcs. Perhaps tho  grcatcst cs- 
pcnclitnrc rhich has cvcr taken placc with brccch-lontlcrs was n t  
Tashlicsscn, whcrc Bake? states that many of tho Turkish battalions 
5rcd away n c d y  300 rounds per man. Yct cvcn this high figurc is 
stated to ham becn cscecdcd .in the fighting in Spotsylrania by ’ 
thc- Aiicricans Kith muzzlc-loaders, for it is rchfcd thnt on or10 
occasion ns~mnuy ns 300 to 400 rounds pcr mian werc fired.‘ , It mill 
bc obscrvcd. that in  both theso last .two inst.anccs this rcmarliablc 
expenditure was iricurrcd strictly on tho. defcnsirc. Tho grcatcst 
amount per man crpcnded on tlic offensin? was perhaps in thc action 
at’ C h m p i p y  during th’c siego of Paris, whcrc tho Frcnclls 11nd 10s 
This was with muzzlc-loaders. 
. .  . 
1 ‘‘Jrapi’s Fire Tncfics,” p. 281. 
3 “ War-in Bulgaria,’.’ vol.5, p. 160. 
4 ‘‘ Ihttlcs and Lcadcrj of the Civil War,” rol. ir, p. 1i4. 
2 6 2  
2 ILid. 
’ JIajne, p. 281. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
5:5
3 2
2 J
un
e 2
01
6 
436 THE TACTICAL OPERXTIOSS OF TIIF, FUTURE. 
rounds pcr man, and cvcntunlly Lad to rctirc from want of ammnni. 
tion. The grentcst crpendituro by tlic Russi:ms-in 1877-78 in one 
day is statcd nt riincty-four rounds pcr man, :tnd this may be taken 
as on tho o5ensire. 
Grealer 011 D+iisice than on Ojhsire.-It will Lc secn, thcrcforc, 
that  the cspcnditnrc on thc clefcnsirc is gcncrnlly grcatcr tliari on tho 
offcnsirc. Thc reason for tliis is siinplj- that  tlic clcfcndcrs begin 
firing n t  longcr ranws, and that a good part  of tlic attackers' time is 
taken up in adr-ancing. Tlic tcndcncj- was alsn cmphasizcd in tho 
caw of tlic Frcncli nnd thc Turks by tlicir being nrincd Kith longcr. 
ranging wxpons  tlian tlicir opponcnts, though at Tnskkesscn the 
Russians ncrc  cqually well nrmed. 
3,crcascd by zcniit of Fire Discipliiie and i lr f i l lcry  Preparation.-It 
must also be poiiitcd out that, in  many cascs. oii tlic dcfcnsivc thcrc was 
littlc pretcricc of fire discipline, and in tho :itt:ick-as at Champignj- 
thc adranco was conducted with littlc o r  no artillery prcpnration. 
Uiidcr thcse circuinstnnccs, i t  is cvidcnt that  tlic nbscnco of a good 
sjstcxn of fire discipline nnd of ndcquatc artillcry proparation cnuscs 
a largely iiicrcascd cspcudituro of ammunitioii. Tlw obvious deduc- 
tion is that tlic bcttcr the troops nrc tiairicd in fire clisciplinc, and 
the morc correct tlie tactics of tlio G e n e d ,  tlic less will bo tlio 
nunibcr of rounds fircd, and, conseqncxitly, the srnallcr nccd bc tho 
xiumber carried. Tlio cs t ra  powcr of R rapid-firing wcapon is due 
much nioro to the amount of projcctilcs it l inn tlic powcr of throwing 
i n  n short spnce of tinae tlinn to the  number i t  acttrally fires off. Tlio 
reasons for this will I c  found discussed undcr tlic licading of Quick. 
firing Guns. 
Esyeri71iewl~.-Turning to tlie field of esperimcnts as IL guide-but 
one on which wc niust bcwarc of placing too much faith-it  as found 
that at Casscl, in 1878, the XI th  Gcrman Army Corps, trained in  tho 
UCIV priiiciplcs of firo tactics, including long-rnngc fire, cspendcd an  
average of 100 to P O  rouncls pcr man in  tlircc OF four hours’ manw- 
mes, coiiductcd natuidly with much grcatcr economy and coolness 
thau would Lc tho casc in battlc.1 Captain N a p e  adds onc-half 
ninrc as allo\\-ancc for loss and incrcascd consumption due to  tlic cs- 
citcucnt of Lnttlc, mnking 160 rounds pcr rnnn ncccssnry to bc taken 
into the fight n-itli single loaders i n  fnturc. Thc Ihssians, on tho 
othcr linnd. consider 120 rounds sufficient. prcfcr t6 tnkc tho 
zncan and fix thc numbcr,at 150 rounds per mau Kith singlc loaclcrs. 
The Question with Jfagnziiie Rijes.-l’urning to tho same quqstion 
with xnagaziiic riflcs, it is statcd, both by Coloncl Slndo’ nnd Captain 
hlaync, thnt it lias k c n  p r o d  by espcrixncnt “ thnt tho continuous 
fire of ma,oazinc rifles is only more rapid than that of ordinary 
brccch-loaders whilo anp cartridges rcmairi in tho magazine, . nod 
that  there is no general gain in rapidity of firc in filling i t  aRmn as 
soon a8 cmpty.” This statemcut may now 11avc to  bc modified if 
other nations follow tlic esamplo of tlic Austrians, nnd lonil cntircly 
through thc magazine; and Captain 3 f n p c  justly points out that an 
m. 
’ Maj-nr, 1’. 2~3. 
“H.U.S.1. Journal,” Modern JIilitarJ. Rifler and Firc Twtics,” rol. sssii. 
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TIIE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 437 
intermittent firc, such as is to bc expected in battlc, in which tho 
maszinc is used :ind rcfillcd diiring the pauses, the cspcnditurc will 
bc ruucli grcater than with sin& loaders. No limit c:in now be put  
on tlic numbcr of rounds ablc to bo fired tlirough fatigue resulting to 
tlic firer;! for tlic present small-bores have far less recoil than tho 
rifles out of which tlie Turks fired nearly 300 rounds per man at 
Tashlicssm It is tlicrcforo to bc expected that-with small bodics 
N O ~ C  patticularly-thc number of rounds fired may run up to cvcn 
500 or GOO pcr innn on flic dcfcnsivc, when tlrere i s  bail #re ilisc@Zine. 
An cfficicnt systciii of firc discipline will, hoircrer, change tho 
aspect of tho qucstion. By firo discipline all long-mngc iiro will 
bc kcpt strictly ncdcr control, and ammunition will not be wasted in 
indepcndcnt firing n t  imxncnsc ranges ns was done at Plcrna nnd at  
Gravelotte. But as tlic coiiibat gets hotter and closer ranges are 
reached, ns OEccrs and non-commissioned officcrs fall, so tho strain 
on nicn’s ncrves becomes greater, and may soon causc them to disrc- 
gard thc words o r  signals of thc few rcniaining lenders. Finally, 
uuconirollcd magazine firc may bccomc the ordcr of thc day on onc or  
both sides. Dcforc long ouc sidc or tlic otlier will givc \ray and rc- 
treat nndcr a hail of lullcts. By undisciplined troops this stago 
would probably xicvcr hc reached, for nil tlicir energies and all their 
ammunition would havc bcen cspcnded in long-rangc firing, as indeed 
happened many times during the latter part of the Fmnco-German 
War. 
hTzcniber of Roilids A’ecessarypcr Eijre with Traiiied ! h o p  fit Baffle. 
OJ, flrc OJeirsire.-All things consirlcrcd, and allowirig for possiblo 
insufficient artillery preparutioxi, i t  is consicicred that troops well 
trained in fire discipliric sliould cntcr into an attack with 200 ronnrls 
per mnn actually ou tlic soldicr’s peison, or 50 morc than with singlc 
loaders. There slioulcl also be ndditionnl rounds avnilablc for con- 
reynnco to liixn whcu chances occur duriug tho fight. In fising tho 
abore largc nuxnbcr it niust bc bornc in mind tbnt thc soldicr’s 
couragu cvnporntcs in tho sainc proportion as his nmmnnition, niid 
that i t  is cstrcmely problemntical whcthcr rescrvc :imrnnnition can bc 
conrcpd to him during tlic combat. 
OJI Uio Ddele,uicc.--Thc figures of nxnmunition espcnditnrc tor tlio 
dcfcnce are usaallj so much greater tlicn for tlic ottnck tliat we would 
wish to cnsurc 300 rouucls pcr nian to a iorcc holding :L position. Tliis 
figuro has also thc npproval of Coloiiel Sladc,’ nnd onglit inorc easily 
t o  be supplied for the dcftxicc than tkc 200 for thc nttack, for in tho 
former casc ommunition columns can couc up morc easily, nud boses 
of amniuriition c:in bc placed n t  inter\-als dong the line. 
A’lcaiber A’ecessnry to ReJIl I’ouelies aud Carts.-In addition to the 
aborc amount, there must bc ample means of filling up crripty pouches 
at tho cud of the day, so that in tlic future Q Gcncral niny.xiot bo 
prcvcnted, like 3I:irshal Dazaine, from rcucwiiig a drawn battlc under 
moro favourable circumstances the following morning. As, lion-cvcr, 
it is unlikely that tlic acerage espcnditurc per inan iu an Army 
1 R.U.S.I. Jour~id,” Xodern JIilitarr Hiflcs and Firc Tactics,” rol. sxrii. 
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43s THE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 
Corps woulrl cscccd 150 rounds in a day’s hard battlc, it ought to& 
suficient if tlic Divisional and Army Corps columus carry that num- 
ber bctwccn them, thus making n total of 350 rounds pcr man wit11 
tlio army in the field. 
Scale recently adopted 3 1  Forcigit Arniies.-Table A sto\ci  tllo 
viows of foreign nations on this important subject, and it will be seeIl 
tliat tlic niost recent, chnngc-that of Gcrmany-is iu thc direction 
of providing tlio soldicr with n largely increased supply on his penon, 
so as to render him morc indcpcudcnt of rcservc nmmnnition. On 
tlic otlicr Iiand, France, d i i l e  cai-rying fcwcr rounds arailablc a t  once 
for battle, lins a largc rcserre with tlic ammunition columns ready to 
refill pouches at tho end of the day. The tendency, liowcvcr, to in- 
crease thc ammunition supply does not yet nppeiir exhausted, axid the 
nbovc caniiot be rcgarded ns final. Every dccrcasc of weight brought 
nbout by smokeless powder, the substitution of aluminium for brass 
in tlic cartridge cnsc, or other change of mntOriel will bo made use of 
to increase the numbcr of rounds carried. 
This question or’ weight prevents our loading thc soldier with the 
whole 900 rounds wo have fixcd on ns necessary for a battlc. Mobility 
being, nest to fighting efficiency, tho most iniportnnt esscntinl’ to an 
arniy, it is dcsiiablc to keep down tlic weight on men’s backs as much 
as possible. Tlic proportion of weight of thc M.H. cartridge to 
tliat of our new weapon is as 70 to 115. Tlius the soldier eaii 
now carry 115 rounds without incrcnsc of weiglit. It is desirable to 
augment. this to 120, and ecorioniizo weight in foomc’other portion of 
his kit. Thus tlic clothcs brush might bc dispensed with, and the 
water bottlc lightened br being mado of vulcanitc; even the capo 
rniglit be left with thc baggage in temperate climates, and orcry effort 
mado to liglitcn tho soldier’s packs. 
JIetAod of Carrji iy fhe Anmiriait ion on the Soldier.--lls to the uay 
i r i  whicli this nmmnnition should bo distributed on tlic person of tho 
soldier, tho xucthods a t  present in usc in’thc various annies may be 
studied with adwntngc. 
Framx.-Witli tiic old riflc 78 rounds wcro .carried, vk., 3G in 
pouclics on tlio belt axid 42 in the buapsack. 
Azistria.-Each soldier carries 100 rounds, viz., GO equally divided 
between two pouches in front, and tho remaining 40 in a larger pouch 
Echind. The water- 
proof brcad bag can also be used for ammunition. Tho tlirco pouches 
aro fixed on the vmistbclt independent oE the liunpsnck straps, so that 
tlic l i t ter  can bo icmorcd without depriving the soldier of his ammu- 
nition and reservo rations.’ 
Gerinuiiy has copied tho Austrian method, and carries GO rounds in 
two pouclics in front and 90 in a largc pouch behind.% 
Riissia.--84 rounds on man-30 in pouchcs and 54 in  knapsack. 
Is’lIghitd.--t10 in pouchcs and 30 i n  valise (old equipment). The 
Of the aborc methods, tlic Austrian manifestly presents many 
This pouch Iias also a division for iron rations. 
new ecpipiiicnt is not settled. 
1 Majnc, p. 292. “Tran;feldt,” 16W. 
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410 TUE. TACTICAL OPERBTIOSS OF TIIE FUTURE. 
advnntagcs. The cstrcmc importance of a man 4eing ablc to remore 
his -dso without depriring himsclf of his ammunition and rations 
is sufficicntly obvions, as also tho advantagc of being ahlo to gct at 
his rcscrvo ammunition without rcmoving his d i s c  or  screwing his 
hand behind his sliouldcrs to get a t  i t  in an impossible position. 
this method tlio Germans'carry 150 rounds, so that tho British should 
find no difficulty in carrying 120, Icaving room at tho samc time for 
extra rounds to be given out before bnttlc. As regards tho weight on 
tho bclt, thoso' who shoot with cartridgo bclts well know how little 
inconvcnicncc is suffcrcd fium them when tlio bclt is bucklcd very 
Zoose, so that thc weight rcsts on thc hips and not on tllc stornacl~. 
Tho reason is simply that tho hips nrc tho natural supporters of 
weight, and nro closo to tho centre of gravity of thc body ; hero the 
breathing is not interfcrcd with, and tho arms and shoulders arc left 
perfectly frco for using tho riflc. What is required, thcn, is an 
. cquipmcnt similar to that of tho Anstriansor Germans, arid rncn must 
bo encouraged to looscn thcir bclts to tho nccessai-y cstcnt \Yliencrer 
thcy march with full weights. A pair of largc breast pockets should 
also be providcd to contain cstra rounds in case tho havcrsack con- 
tained rations. Tho mcn should be trnined to use tho extra ammu- 
nition first, and to rcscrvc that in their front pouchcs forcloso I=aiigcs, 
as bcing most easily got at. Sparc magazines might bc carried in 
tkcir front pouches. 
Didribtttioit of Rentaining Rourids.-Tho i*omnining 60 rounds of 
the 200 would be carricd by tho battalion carts and mulcs,' while of 
the extra, 150 rounds per man, it sccms desirable that 50 shonld he 
carried in tho divisional ammunition column to fill up empty battalion 
carts during tho figlit, and tho remaining 100 should bo distributcd 
bctpvcen tho battalion baggago wagons and the rcar scctions of the 
army corps ammunition column so as to bc arnilnblo whcn tho battle 
is over. *This proportion takes account of thc difliculty of rcplcnish- 
ing  tho~supply during a fight, a difficulty which docs not esist with 
a r t i l l q  to  D like degree. 
Silpply of Artille y Ammio~itioia.  
Rate of Firing h c r e a s d - I n  settling tho nmounf of ammunition 
ncccssary per gun, w c  arc not hnndicappcd by want of prcvioos expcri- 
cncc as in tlic case of magazino rifles. Thc gun is still a singlo loadcr, 
and likcly to remain so, except possibly for horse artillcry acting with 
cavalry. IIorrevcr, tho nsc of brakes for chccking recoil, tlic s p k m  of 
carrying shcll rcady fuzcd and incycasd rapidity in setting tho fuze, 
probably tho introduction of nictnl cartridgo cnscs, pcrcussion loch, 
and tiaversing gcar to cnablc the laycr to dispcnse with thc scrviccs 
of the man at tho handspike, and certainly the introduction of smokc- 
less powdcr-all thcsc will increase tho ratc of iirc to a considcmble 
crtont, whilc thc incrchscd amount of artillcry prcparation now 
nccessary rcndcrs i t  probable that, for the assailants a t  Icast, a much 
Total, 
74500 per bnttalioo, or nbout 80 rounds per rifle. 
I Each cart cnrrics 10 bosc3 of 1,100 each, nnd cnch mule 2 boxcs. 
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THE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF TnE FUTURE. 441 
b g c r  er7cnditurc of ammunition will fakc plwo in thc futnrc than 
in tho past. Wlicn both sidcs intend being asssilants; and tlic 
&Ilery duel is hotly contested, tho expenditure will reach a rcry 
high figure. But against this must bc set thc f w t  that shrapnel fir0 
is now moro cffectiro than of old. Flesh and blood can only stand n 
e d a i n  amount, and crcry slicll being now more effective than 
formerly, and nt the same timc tho rapidity of fire Icing ilicreased, 
the decision of the artillery duel, once the range isfountl, must occupy 
8 sliortcr time, providcd’ncithcr side seeks artificial cover’. Yet firing 
will commcnco a t  longer ranges, and much preliminarr ammunition 
espendituro will fakc placc wlierc tho ground pcrmits of such ranges. 
Past Experience.-If wo look for guidance to tho esperience of past 
Tyms w o  find that the cxpcnditurc of tho fifteen batteries of the 
Prussiau Guard a t  St. P r i n t  was a t  nn average of 100 rounds pcr 
grin,' and tlic fight was not bcgun in  this part of thc field till about 
2 P.Y. In n battle cornmcncing Inuck cnrlier in the day the cspendi- 
ture might have reaclicd 200 rounds per gun, espccially if tlic hostile 
artillery had bceii nble to makc a bettcr fight. At Mars-la-Tour, tho 
eat nrtillery bnttlc, soxnc batteries almost attainccl this amount. 
%c 1st and 3rd horse artillery bntteries of the IIIrd drmp Corps 
fired 191 and 194 rounds per gun respectivclj,2 and the arerage of the 
wholo fifteen batteries of the corps was 130 per gun, and would hnro 
h e n  much grentcr liad ammunition been amilnble. Hoff baucr says :3 
Tho deficiency of ammunition cspericnccd in  the Rffcrnoon, nioro 
prticularl~-on tlic right of tlicposition, . . . . had its iritluenco 
in checking tho dctocliing of bntterics (to other parts of tlic lino 
whcro wanted). Tho slowness of their fire and tho  actual silenco 
of aomo of thorn cncournged tho enemy to makc more frcqucnt and 
vigorous attacks.” Tlicn Iio states tliat thc German attacks from 
tho Bois do St. Arnand’rcceivcd no direct support from artillery, and 
werc consequently uiisuccessful. Later on, he continues: tho account 
of this bnttlc teaches tliat, owing to grcat expenditure of nmmunition, 
tho first linc of wagons of tho ammunition columns should follow tho 
troops RS closely as possiblc . . . . and that tho number of artillcry 
ammunition columns should, ns 3 rnlc, bc increased in that (the first) 
line.” Prince Krnft tclls us that this WRS done after Grarelotte, and 
linlf tho.  infantry first linc columns w r c  tnrncd into artillery’ 
columns. It may bc remarked tliat this could not 60 casily linvo 
bcen done had their infantry columns consistcd of OUY S.A.B. carts. 
The same high autliority s a p  he is “convinced that the quautity of 
ammunition xliich mo carry, \vhcthcr with tho batteries or with tho 
columns, is not sufficient. You cannot safely reckon, espccially in 
tho casc of dccisivo battles wlicrc such great masses of troops nro 
collected to fakc part in tho decision, upon the columns being nblo to 
make their way tlirougli the combatant troops during the very day 
of battle. We must, thcrcforc, fill up the li~nbers and wagons of tho 
1 Prince Krnft, “9th Lcttcr on drtillev.” 
IIoffbauer. 
3 IIoffbauer, “The German Artillerj,” trsnslatcd by Captain Hollist, p. 135. 
Prince &aft, “9th Letter on Artderj.” 
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442 THE TAOTIOAL OPEHATIOSS OF TUE FUTURE. 
Latterics r i t h  as niucli ammunition. as t h y  can possibly consnu 
during the  wholo lcngth of a day of battle.” .lie tlicn gocs on to 
shorn how if tho battle of St. Priwt had commcnccd in tho morning 
and not in tho afternoon, the  battcrics must l i a \ ~  fallen short, owing 
to tho clivisiond columns haring bccn used to fill up the cmpty boxes 
of the IIIrd and X t h  Corps CnpgCd two days bCfOrC, lcaring the 
Gunrds’ battcrics dcpcndent on thc army corps columns in reBT. 
Aftcr the 18th August all the columns wcrc exhausted, and they had 
first to go todlie park at Hcrny to tho cast of Nctz, round by.Po& 
h-hlousson, only to find even that depbt exhaustcd. Tlicn they p ~ -  
cccdcd by forced marclies t o  Sanrlouis on the  frontier, where 'tile, 
filled up, aud only just arrired a t  Scdm in time for the battle, a 
fortn:;!.i; after Gmvclottc. It is ovidcnt that a sixnilarrisk ought not 
to bc run in  fntnrc. Ammunition columns and: parks must carry 
suKcicnt to prercnt their bcing cntirely emptied by two such day8 
of battle. For tli.ough thero w r e  two d a j ~  of har? fight& yet the 
guns which fought on tlic 16th took comparatively little part‘ in the 
espcnditure of tho 18th.’ Thcrcforo thc  total, qspcndituyc was not 
much morc than might havo bccu incurrcd in, oiic long day of battle. 
At Solfcrino i t  is stated that  somo guns fired as much as 500 round8 
eacl1.y 
Nttniber of Rounds arriced at as mcessary in I;iititre.-Taking 
things into consideration it seems desirable: that  250 rounds per gun 
shonld Lc available for the  ’ day’s Lnttlc, i .~. ,  should bc carried with 
thc  battcrics and 1 s t  cc!iclou of columns, of which a t  least 150 should 
be with tho bnttcrics, for tlie columns  ma^ not gct up till h tc ,  an 
Prince Kmft  says, or not at all ;  also, +at. 100 rounds per gun 
additional should be available by the  following .morninm i.c.,.with 
tho rcar sections of the  army corps column; ‘ and thatP50 to 100 
rounds pcr gun be with tho advanccd park: . Coloncl Wnlford, R.A., 
in a lccturc a t  Shocburyness,’ cntcrs minutely irito’tllc question of 
.tho tiinc by which it may bc cxpected that the nmrnunition columne 
will arrirc on the field, and calcnlates that  in the case of an army 
corps marching by ,on0 road only,, tho various. divisional columns 
will arrive on the  scene in ample tirnc for the rcncwal.of, hxnmuuition, 
but that  tlic 1st Section Corps Ammuuitiou Columri >yi!l ilot arrive 
till  1 liour PO minutes after the shrapnel,!\-ith thc corps battcrics may 
bc espcctcd to liavc become cshaustcd.. But tlicsc calculations are 
made on thc supposition that thcro,will bc no blocks on’ the‘ro?d, that 
an action is ,cxpcctcd and tho ammunition columns are closed up to 
t h e  tail of the cornbatants, and that each dirisiounl column will im- 
mediately follow its own division on the line of march. I’- is estrcmely 
doubtful whctlicr this order of march would bp followc ., and appears 
moro likely that wlicn the timc came .the, divisional .nd 1st section 
corps coluniu would march together in rcar of thu combatants of 
t h c  army corps, as indccd is crprcssly laid down should be done in 
the Frcncb regulations. In this case it is ca1cul:itcd that ‘the ammu- 
* 7-ide Uoffbnucr’r Tnblcs.’ 
* I‘ Heruc clu Ccrclc-Yilitoirc,” 5th January, 1800, p. 3. 
3 ‘‘ H.A.I. Journol,” Scptcurbcr, 1630. 
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,lition colunins would not rcach tlic batteries till 54 Louis nftcr 
tlic comnicnccmcnt of an action.' It seems to bc more suitable that any 
estra ammiinition transportcd with the combatants sliould actually 
belong to cacli ba t tcq  or field artillcry division. If all tile ammuni- 
tion coluinns niarchcd togcther in rcar, tho supply Iyitli the battcrics 
lvoiild cvidcntly WI-Y soon run short, if  on the prcseilt scale in our 
service of 108 rounds-per gun.. Tliercforc this numbcr must be in- 
creased Iargclj, ail$, ,though not coming witliix: .tho scopc of this 
pnper, so-long ns 'common shell are merc range-findcrs, tho percentago 
of them carried might Lo reduced, as suggested Coloiel Walford, 
to about: 20 per'ccnt. of tho whole. But in order to .l)o ablo to 
cffectivcly destroy mat6ricl i t  would bc nccessnry to follom the 
csamplc ,of tlic Yrcnck and ndd a wagoxi full of meliiiitc shclls per 
battery. 
It is a curious fact that with tho old 9-pr. R.M.L., oui' bnttcrics 
cnrricd 148 rounds per gun,;or,witli second line of mgons prayidcd 
in India;25G rounds per gun. Now that brcccliloaders have bccn 
introduccd and firing has bccomo more rapid all rouiid, tho number 
of rounds carried pcr battery has bccn 1argcl~- climiir(s7s~etl. 
Coniparison of English with Foreigs Aninitrriztion !i'rnoisport.--Table B 
shows the ~neasurcs forcign Powcrs liavo takcn as compared with 
England, for providing for the crpccfcd cstrs cspciiditurc of nmmu- 
nition. 
(1.) England 11as a much smaller supply of rounds per gun  with tlic 
battery thau  an^- othcr Powcr, csccpt in  the caso of tho Russian 
274-pr. 
(2.) Tlic Englisli battcrx has fewer ammunition n-agons per 
battcry. 
(3.) England al lom for a,smallcr foful supply of nmmunition in 
tlie field per gun tlian my otlicr Powx- for guns of similnr ciilibrc, in 
spite of tlic rear scctions of our army corps column carq-ing a lnrgcr 
proportion per gun tlian any othcr Poivcr. 
(4.) Though OUP horses nrc stronger and better, and though our 
gun cnrrics n lighillcr shell tlinn anypther field battery gnu, yet the 
number of ronnds ,carried per wagon is considerably less ,that1 in 
tlic wigoils of France aud Gcrmany, and the t o t d  y i $ t  of thcso 
ionuds IS; with the ,exccpt.ion of tho Itussian horso art?!]cry, much 
less tlian in the case of forcign Pow-crs. 
(5.),% ,Tim ,weight of our nmmunitiou wagon empty ib much 
grcate~ .  for  .the weight.' of nmmunitiori carried. 'ir!. i t  than those. of 
fo$gn:' l'on-bys. . ~ h q s ' .  tho ,German ficld battery wagon cmpty 
weighs 214 cwt., nnd'cjarrics' 1,617 lbs; of ammunition, mliile tho 
English WO*,A crnptr'ivcighs 232 cwt. and carrics only 1,186 lbs. 
Dcdrtc! ~?is.-Tlius England is inferior in all questions of cconomg 
of ',po\vcr. The m i g h t  of a i i i ~ i i t ~ i a i t i o i ~  Jraicu by six EnglislL horses 
could actimlly t e  conlfortatly carried otb six ucerage pack arrininls. It 
is perfectly evident that the construction .of our wiigons lcids to nu 
ciioi~xnons waste of poi.r-cr ; lCeiC$it, not streiigfh of constraction, np- 
An cuaruinntion of this table will show that : 
" Reruc du Cerclc 3lilitnirc," 9th February, 1630. 
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THE TACTICAL OPERlTIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 445 
p a r s  to bc the ruling principle, and our Arscnal cannot bc congratu- 
latct1 on tlic results nchic~-cd. Tliero is no reason whatcrcr why our 
liSllt field artillcry should not bc provided with a wagon carrxing 
least ninetj. rounds of ammunition (13i cwt.) and weighing 
38 c\vt. packed, including 33 ctrt. for kits and equipment. If this 
vcpo donc wc should bc ablo to carry our ISG rounds pcr gun with 
cigllt ammunition wagons pcr battery, but with tho present wagon 
t,pn of thcm per battery will bc ncccssary to reach that amount. In 
short, as our artillcr~- is-tit present constituted, nothing less tlian an 
addition of thrcc tvagorls pcr battery will placc its imniunition supply 
on a t  all n satisfactory footing. *This mill girc 144 rounds per gun 
with thc battery. With tlic liorsc nrtillcr~. tlic case is similar, but 
tllc neccssity for both lightcr guns and wagons was snfficiently 
shown in thc late ca tdry  mancouvres in ~erkshire .  AS stated clsc- 
rrhcrc, thc qncstion may probably bc scttlcd by tho introduction of 
8 7- or 6-pr. quick-firi?g gun, or lower rclocity 12-pr. for thc batteries 
with tho cmalry division. In thc lattcr case a lighter wagon could 
snrcly bc constrnctcd to carrJ- 72 rounds. 
Coniposifion of Aini)iiiiiifio)i Cotici)ii:s. 
Eiiglish and Foreip Anintti)rition CoZut)i)is.-TIic principal foreign 
notions kecp tlicir infantry nnimnnition columns distiiict from tho 
artillcry columns, and tlio Gcrmnus liarc tlic wagons of c ~ h  of tlicsc 
columns painted n distinctivc colour, tlioso of tho infantry being 
grey and tho nrtillcrj bluc. Thcrc docs not appe'ar to be any grcat 
advantage in this division, and all that secms ncccsjary is thnt tho 
infantry part should be casily dctnchablc and casily distinguishablc. 
Thc French form tlicir artillcry columns into two groups which 
usually march togcthcr, tho first group consisting of twelve artillery 
nnimunition wagons aud two spare gun carriages, and alvnys march- 
ing a t  the head of the column; tlic second group bcing tlic remaining 
wagons, corrcspouding to our ammunition and storc wagons. The 
English divisional ammunition column consists of G artillcry ammu- 
nition wagons, 11 ammunition and storc wagons, 1 sparc gun carriqc 
and 31 S.A.A. carts, for wIiic11 tlic only Oficers nllowcd arc 1 Najor, 
2 subalterns, and a quartermaster. 
Proposed Dicisioiial Anrmunitioit CoZrir)in.-To cnablc this column to 
trnusport nmmunition on thc scalc proposed, viz., fifty rounds per 
infantrr soldicr, 95 pcr gun, and S,OOO per machine-gun, or R total 
of nearly 400,000 rounds of S.A.A., 1,710 artillcry rnnnds, and 
32,000 machine-gun rounds, wc get- 
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398,400 rounds S.A.A. a t  1,100 pcr bos.. . . ' 21 S.A.A. carts. 
32,000 ,, machin'c-gun nmmnnition . . 2 19 
or a.tota1 of 26 ins tcd  of 31. This saving 
may bc uscd to  providc extra :irtillcrywngons. 
El0 artillcry rounds a t  'JO pcr wagon.. . . . . 
nt 1-44 per ammunition 
and storo wagon.. . . 
36 ,, . ,,,' in tho sparc gun car- 
riage.. .. .. ). . .. .. 
9 artillcry cmmil- 
nition rragons. 
6 n-hgons. 
1 carriage. 
,, . EG4 ,, 
- -- 
1,710 rounds. Total cnrriagcs . . 42 
For tho proper. m:mngcmcnt of this column of 42 carriages, ex- 
clusirc of storo wagons, them slionld be n ccimplemcnt of 1 Najor iil 
command;l Captain hnd 1 snbaltcrn for  thc infantry'portion, nnd 9 
snbalteims for thcartillcry portion, bcsidcs a qudrternlastcr to assist 
thc hlnjor. With this organization tho column d l  be capable of 
being split up without detrirncnt. 
Carringes.-Witli rcgard to tlic carringcs, tlic S.A.A. cart lcavcs 
much to lp dcsked. In  its prcscnt form it can be nsed for nothing 
clsc except. S+4.A:, and tlic prcscnt cmtridgcs nrc so strong that 
sepmate compartmcnts for each box nppcnr quitc unnecessnry. Tlic 
balaticc changes with each bos taken out, and cannot bc adjnstcd. 
An open'. cart with a canvas cover as suggcstcd by Captain Harris 
appcnrs~a1l;tliat'is dcsirable, nnd tlic weight ssred could bo used for 
cstm ammunition or entrenching tools. . 
. 1st Sectimt Corps A~i~nizmifioi~ CoZitmii.--Thc 1st Section of tlic 
Corps 'Ammunition Collirnii might also bc madc to carry 95 rounds 
per gun of. tho corps artillcry, nnd thc ammunition part would tlicn 
consist of 16 nrtillcrr ammunition wngons, f spare guu carriages 
(2 appear sufficient), and 10 ammuniiion and store u-agolis, togcthci- 
with S.A.A. carts for tlic c o i p  battalion and dctails. For this, a 
hhjoi; 3 subaltcrns nnd n qunrtermaster might suffice. I n  all 
1st ' echclon columns the artillcry nmmunition wngons should licad 
the column on tho march, followed by thc S.A.A. carts. 
2nd Echelop CoZiimirs.-Thc 2nd 6chelon columns do not rcquiro to  
bc able to morc so rapidly, nnd thcrcforo instcad of s is  horscs per 
immunition id atorc wagon, tho samc might bc clrnmn by four 
animals of a hcaricr class, such as are to bc 8ecn in brewcrs' drays 
in England.-- Theywould scldom hare to go off the road, and might 
thcrcfore bo drircn from the box  -By this mcam the  length of . the 
column would be considerably rednccd without any loss of traction 
power. Thc wagons loadcd with S.A.A. and weighing wlicn packed 
49 cmt. might wen bc brought up to tlic wcight of thosc londcd with 
artillcry ammunition, yiz., 52) cmt., and tlicir number rcdnccd in 
proportion. 
Inste?d of splitting np the 2nd ecliclon columns into thrcc sec- 
tions, it wonld sccm bcttcr to ham tlic same number of sections ns 
esist in front., Fiz., four, each of which would be capnble of bcirig 
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detached with t'roops acting independently, and \\-auld carry n pro- 
portion of rounds eorrcspoiiding to thoso in front. Thus tho 2nd, 
3rd, and 4th sections w o ~ l d  bc similar to divisional colnmris, wliilc 
the- 6th irould net as ?r?d echelon to tlic 1st section corps column, 
wit11 a small section attnched to it as 2nd 6cliclon to thc cava1i.y 
divisionnl column. Thc %id, 3rd, and 4th sections .would thus cncli 
carry about 630,000 rounds of S.A.A. and 1,800 artillery roiinds, 
wonld consist of 17 ammunition nnd storu \vngons for S.A.A. 
(including onc for machine-gun ammunition) and 12 ammunition 
and store wagons for artillery ammunition, with 1 or 2 spwc gun-  
cax-finges. Thc 5th section would bc constitutcd in a corresponding 
glanncr. As tho corps artillery arc, howover, unlikely to firc nway 
90 many rounds as tho divisional Inttcries, tho number of rounds per 
p n  in  this section might bo reduced to 60 or 70. For c:ich of 
thesc a Major, two subalterns, nnd a quartcrrnnster should bc suffi- 
cient, as therc would not bu s01Tiue11 dctncliing of wagons as xi th  tho 
1st Gchclon columns. 
Having disposed of tho question of tho supplj of ammunition 
ncccssarr Kith an army in the field, and \\*hero it is recornmcndcd to 
be carried, tho method of passing on this supply from rear to front 
on tlic day of battlc will now be examined. 
Repletcisliiiig Expeiided Aniniuiritioa. 
In Cnptnin Najnc's ".Fire Tactics " \rill bc found n pi&is of tho 
regulations of most armies on tliis subject, so fir as concerns infantry. 
acnerally. speaking, ammunition wagons Iiwc to follow troops in  
action ns closely as possible, and privates trained as carriers clistributo 
ammunition from thc wagons to the fighting line. Tlici-cforc unless 
tho n-agons qrro brought close np and probably exposed, it sccms 
impossiblc to distribute an ndcqunto supply by this mcthod. 
Princip2cs to  be f o l l o m d  i n  orranging for Aninairnition Siippl!j.--Lct 
us now exnmiuo into tlic principles it is ncccssary to follow in 
arranging for tho rcplenisliment of nmmunition : 
- It is obvious that tlic nearer troops get to the encmy, thc more 
hotly they becomc engaged, and tho less undcr control; thcreforc, .tho 
greater bccomcs ths difiiculty of nttcnding to such mnttcrs is refilling 
pouches, tlicir wholo attention being fired on tho cncmy in p o i i t . .  
Under thcso circumstances no complicated metliod of supplying tlicm 
with ammunition, and no sjstcm dependent on n .few privntcs for 
being- curried out, will answer. Simplicity is thc' soul of warfare, 
and any: such complicated rjptern will fall .to pieccs under tho stress 
of an enemy's fire. If picked men nrc clioscn as carriers tlieir 
examplo is lost to tlic firing lino in front and their movements to tho 
rear at a ciitieal moment might be misinterpreted by tlirir comrades. 
Rut ;t.he further to tlic rear wc go tho steadier tho troops arc found 
to bc,. and tho more their attention- om be directed to helping their 
comrades in front. ,CCU2, 
1st Pri~ic~Ze.-Thcreforc it is cvidcnt tlmt' airy.  method of 1 s u p -  
plying aniviioiition iciider fire iwortler.to'Le succesijitl iirzist t c  J e p i d e n t  
018 the troops i?, rear, aiitlmot on those &P front. 
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Again, the hotter tlio fight, tho ICSS desirable is it that 
ammunition should hnvo to be distributcd whi!c it is going on, 
for i t  exposes the carriers and carts anti wastcs thc time of thorn 
firing, many of whom will be too escitcd to noticc tho packets of 
ammunition tlirust into thcir hands. I n  fact, it s e e m  iinpossihle to 
disfribtite aiitntroiifioia to ir3fantry dtiririg the critical stages of th 
coliibnt, i.e.,  within 700 yards of the enemy, and it is stated that the 
Austrians aud Germans are rccognizing this fact. 
~ J Z C Z  Priaci~~Ze.--Thcrcforc anothcr principlc dcduccd is that tie 
m e i t  iiizist carry biz their persons to the critical stagrs stificient anirnuni 
tion to eiisare n successful endiiig to the aftack. From this it follows 
that the aniriiunition used during the early stages should be supplied 
as far as possible from tho. ammunition carts or wagous, so as to 
lcnvc those camicd on the pcrsori for the closc attack alone. Tliis 
principlo is carried out in the rarious arrnics by distributing extra 
rounds before an action takcs plncc. 
BTeans of conveying Aiii~nti~iitioia cinder Infmtf y Fire.-It sccms 
riskj cspcrimcnt to bring carts and wagons undcr infantry fire, in t h w  
days of smokclcss powder, as is contemplated by most nations, for such 
large objects axe bound t G  attract fire, *licro R single horse or mule 
would escape unobscircd. T ~ c  ground, too, may forbid tlic advance 
of R l icarj  reliicle, and it. is ,z niisapplication of a mat!s strength to 
make liirn a beast of burden. Thcrcforc, the most suitablo means of 
oonrcying ammunition into the firing line, whcn it can bo done, 
appcars to bo pack nnimals. Each mule casily carries two borce, 
c*lch with 1,100 rounds (new rifle), wcighing 171 Ibe. in all. There- 
fore, our two mnlcs pcr battalion carr 4,400 rounds, or about 15 
doubling tho number of males pcr battalion may bo considcrcd. 
Distribution of Exfra  l l o u d s  hefore entry into Action.-As pre- 
rionsly mentioned, we proposc to distribute cighty ronnds per man on 
cntry into action, but this numbcr need only be givcn to tho firing 
linc nnd supports, and a reduced number to the rcscr’vc companies, 
thus Icaring tho mules and perhaps one cart untouclied. Or i f  work. 
ing in brigadc, the brigade rcscrvo formed in our ScrFice might su ply 
first advanco to thc attack, allowing thcir two carts and mules to 
accompany them intact, and ready to take adrantago of pauscs in tho 
combat. On tho defcnsirc these cxtm rounds might bo supplicd 
from the ammunition columns, but on tho offcusiro it is not likely 
thcy would bo up in time. Naturally, tlio rcplenishmcnt under fire 
might bc hclpcd by rounds carried by Officers and non-commissioncd 
oficcrs, nnd tliose takcn from the dcnd and woundcd by tho “battle 
police.” Howeyer, thc grcat secret will bo to start the men off with 
su5cient ammunition in the first place, and ncrcr to let tho mules 
snd carts be scpersted from tlicir battalions on tho march. 
Re~le~iishnieiit of drf i l lenj  Aiizt~iunitioii cinder Fire.-’Pho difficnlty 
of supplying ammunition to artillcry undcr fire is not nearly so great 
as with infantry, for the distance from the enemy is longer and tlio 
number of units of fire much smallcr. Eowvcr, tho same piinciplo 
rounds for cach man of a firing linc of 3 5 0 men. Thc advisability of 
the  extra cighty rounds pcr man to the battalion or battalions w f iich 
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llOlds of working from tlic rear to the front, and  leaving tlic com- 
mander of thc battery to CODCCntilltc his- energies on tho shooting. 
Iis a gelieral rule, tho ammuuition shonld bo supplied from the 
,,.qons first, cornnicncing at tlic \c-ogon bodics, tlic linibrrs and tcaiiis 
being undcr  COW^ and full wagons being sent up from the t2clielon in  
rcal. Ivlien required. 
f,’ystenis at presozt laid (Iotc)~-Tablc (3 gives, as shortlr as possible, 
tllc sjstcm of supply in the nrtillcrirs of E:xigl:ind, Fmiice, and Gcr- 
311anj*, when likely to feninin long in ox10 position. The methods 
prsued arc evidently very fiixriilar iri England :ind Germany, in spitu 
of tho sc\-ero condemnation by I’rinco Kraft’ of so ninny fcliclons of 
wagons. In  France, howcrer, tlicrc arc important points of diifer- 
cu~c .  Uulikc tlic forrncr couutrics., France lays down tliat the empty 
,Vagons arriving from tho guns sliall. remain with the 6‘ fchclou do 
combat ” till full ones arrive from tlic ammuuitioii coliirnn, whcxi tlicir 
contents arc transferred to tlic battcrF wagons. Thc Frcnch’ also, 
bj- tho order of Dcccrnbcr 2Stl1, ISS8, liarc dispcnscd wiili thc inter- 
lllcdiatc Cclielon of ~i.agoir$, and consider that it only complicatcs 
matters and rendcrs supervision diniciilt, espccidly when battcrics 
suddenly cliarigc position. The distance cf 550 yards. in rear of tlic 
guns has not to bo C~CCCilCd, a i d  is thought to girc suficiexit itri- 
inunity from fire. The English battcry lins cvidcxitly ari acivantngc 
in posscssixig a Captain to look d t c r  tho ~agoxrs axid regulate tIic 
supply. A11 t h e e  countries lay down, lioivercr, that tlxc commandcr 
of tho battery or group I I ~ S  to  scud for arnmunition whcn rcquircd, 
instcad of lcaving tliu regulation of the supply to tliosc in  rear, though 
thc French regulations cnconragc iiiitiativc in this direction on tho 
part of tlio sergcoiit-major i n  charge of tlic wagons. Thc ItaIian 
regulations differ from tho abore, and lay down that tlm b:ittery 
~ a g o n s ,  when empty, arc to proceed at oxicc to tho 2nd Bclrelon of thc  
m w z t t d i o n  c o Z t ~ ~ ~ z ) ~ s ,  their places at tlio battcries being supplied 
from tho 1st 6cliclou column by requisition from thc battery, t!ms 
involving R changc of carriages. 
Thc chief point worth noticing about tlic Rnssian system is that 
tho carriages nrc fitted with intcrcliari~eablc trays, each containing 
thrco heaq- or fivc light shell, while :I similar numbnr of cartridges 
arc also packed in  iritcrehangcablc cartouchcs. Thus n small supply 
can be left with tlio gun \\-liilc the carriages arc under corer, and 
packing empty carriages is facilitatcd. 
Arm Ii-rtich Idea.--lt is said that the French proposc to do a\\-ai 
with the 1st line battcrF ammunition wagons altogether; and to sub- 
stitute two limbers for each i~agoxi, with forty rounds eaclx, c l r a ~ ~  by 
tn-o Lorscs and intcrchangcablc wit11 tlxc gun limbers. IVlicn tho 
gun limber is cmpty, it is to proceed :it onco to thc iicarcst \ragons of 
the amrunnition column to bc refilled, and its place taken up  at the  
gun by mother limber from the rcnr. Thus the lend and ccntro 
horses nrc pcrmnncntlr niidcr cover. Tlic \vagons of t hc nmiiiunition 
“9th Lettcr on Artillerr,” “R.A.I. Edition,” p. 91. 
“ Rcruc du lcr do 31ilitairc;’ 2ud Pcbruar?, 
VOL. ZXXY. a i r  
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column are to Lc pwkcd with intcrchangcablc limber Loses, SO that a 
limber can at once lo supplied with fresli.boxes full. 
Tlierc is a simplicity a b u t  this .method which is very taking, but 
the weight of the limbel. boxes to be lifted .on enxy empty limber’is 
Probably the Russian system ,of pcrcking.ia prefei*ab!e, 
for it can bc douc by one’ ‘man,. .’ .It is doubtful, also, wllcther. two- 
ahwlcd vehicles are as ’ good over. rough ‘ground as ammunition 
m-agons, but ccrtaiidy limbers such 9 the abovo are vastly prefe&do 
to tho henry ammunitkon carts tricd at Okchampton in ,1889. ... Tho 
]&tier carried sixty rounds‘and rcquircd four liorscs to drag them, thus 
no Sving  of animals or nicn was ;effected, arid tho wcight on thc tw-p 
wliccls was far too much for soft‘ground. 
Truitsmission of Orders, - Tho ,cliicf difficulty in keeping tho 
mscliincry of ammunition supply in working order lics in securing 
tho rapid and correct transmission of ordcizj to tho kchelons in rear, 
a d  in tlio latter finding out what thcy may bc rcquircd to do. In  
connection with this i t  is interesting to study tho latest regulations 
worked out bg the French on tho subject.’ All connection i s  cstab- 
lished from rear to front by means of ‘‘ agcnts dc liaisoxi” o r  r e p ?  
scntatives froxn each 6cli.elon in war, which aro attaclicd tcmporarilj- 
to the 6clicloii nest  in front. Thus, cacll 1st fdielon ammunition 
column scnds a non-commissioned oficcr to follow tlic commandcr of 
. t.hc group of batteries to which it is- afiliatcd, and two (in case a 
battery wcrc detached) to tlic Oficer in chargo of thc .“Cchelon do 
combat ” of the grOup, irliilo tlio’ lattcr, in turn, has similar repre- 
scntativc with cadi battcry or group coxnmnndcr. Even tllc. limbers, 
whcii undcr corer, hnvo nu “.agent dc liaison ” with tho comniandcr 
of tho battcrg. Whcn.aiiy.ordcrs or communications havc to be sent 
t o  the bodies in rear, tlieso “agcnts ’’ convey them, each to his Own 
&lielon, and return to thcir stations -immediately . tho orders. are 
cxccutcd. Each mill also remind the commander. to whom - he, is 
attachcd of anything forgottcn in rcgard to his fcliclon,. and will 
keep himself iriformed of 6verjtliing pertaining to it. .. By this means 
it is hoped that communications may bc kept up without .tho 
slightest hesitation, and certainly there scems good reason for t h e  
bclicf. . .  
Proposed Sptei)i.-Dy combining the good points of:’ tlio above 
systcms with tlic ‘principle of woi*kirig from the rear to the front, wc 
arrive at the following sptcm :- 
Every carriage v i th  tho batteries nu? 1st’ fclielon ‘ammunition 
columns should bc pnckcd with intcrchangeablo trays of ammunition, 
each tray containing three or  four rounds complctc. This coulri 
easily be done if brass cartridgc cases \wrc introduced. Tho lb agents 
do liaison ” sjstem sliould be establislicd throughout. . The wag* 
of tlio battery or group (escept, those wit11 ‘the guns) should be‘nll 
kept togptlicr undwa Cpptain;iiot more than 600 yards froin thc.guns 
in action, and that Oficcr sliould regulatc the supply of ammunition 
t o  tlic batteries in conecrt with his “ ngcxits,” with whom hc could .. . 
objection. 
Reruc du Crrclc’Xiitairc,” Fcb; 2nd;Dtk, and lGth, 1630. 
2 11 2 
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communicatc by an ordcrly. Hc would thus bc kept informed of the 
exact stntc of thc ammunition expcnditnre, and could rcplacc empties 
without troubling thc commanders of batterics. I lc  would also gct 
due warning, through his agcnt ” with tho group commander, of 
any conternplatcd changc of position. Wagons, wlien nearly empt,-, 
would plncc tlicir rcmaining full trays on tlic pound, and proceed to 
the Captain in rcar. BZeanwhilc, thc latter Officcr will liavc scnt the 
A.C. agciit ” to his ammunition column, and OR arrival of full \vagons 
their contenfs x*iIl bc rapidly transferrcd to tho empties by means 
the trays. Should timc prcss thc teams might bc erclinngcd, for it. 
is of far pcntcr  importancc to keep the samc liorscs and rncn with a 
battery than thc same wagons, and the timc’ t?kcn to changc teams 
and tnkc off a fcm gunncrs’ kits would bo vcry short comparcd with 
repacking, i f  cvcry shell and cartridge has to bo sepnratcly ti.ans. 
fcrred. In casc of erncrgcncy, tho wngons of tho colanin might go 
dircct to tlic guns, but as tlic liorscs will bcnntrnincd to stand firc and 
the drivers infcrior, it is advisablc to avoid this whcn possible. 
The 2nd linc of wagons of each group of bnttcries might be massed 
togcther on tlic march whcn near thc enemy, and follow in rcar of 
the body of troops to which they belong. 
Howtasnfs of di~rmtiiritiotz CoZtimras.-With rcgnrd to the procccdin,s, 
of the ammunition columns, tho same principlc of working from the rcar 
should be followcd out. Thc commander of tlic column dus t  do lik 
best to anticipatc tlic wishes and wants of thoso cngngcd in thc all- 
absorbing combat. Kcws of battlc tmvcls fast, and may probably 
reach him bcforc either of his (‘ agcnts ” arrire from thc front. In 
spit0 .of cvcry carc it will frequently happen that Iic rcceircs no 
orders, and will havc to act on his own initintivc. Tliis hc must. 
be encouraged to do, and must prcgs on to thc front. In dcfault of 
orders k~ should halt tho main part of his column just off tho road, 
I when hc judges himsclf to bc within 2 or 3 milcsof thc guns, and send 
off two sections immcdiutely, each under an Officcr, one to tho artil- 
lery, consisting of tho ninc nrtillcry Rmmunition wagons (in tho caw of 
divisional columns), and the other of about eight S.A.A. cnrts, to find 
their respcctivc arms in action. T h s c  vehicles, likc d l  ammunition 
wagons or carts, should bo paintcd a distinctirc colonr, or be pro- 
vided. with distinguishing flags, so as to catch the c;ye of the 
“agents,” 0 1 9  ot1iei.s hunting for t h m .  Thc ammunition column 
commander nnd his subordinates arc much morc likely to be success- 
fnl in finding thc position of their division in thc fighting linc than 
arc a fcw cmpty carts or wngons from the front to succced in dis- 
covering tho mhercabonts of their ammunition column. Tlio sonnds 
of thc firing, and tlic woundcd mcn and strctchcr bearcrs passing to 
the rear, will be ncvcr-failing guides to the Officers of the ammuni- 
tion columns on nearing tho field of battlc. Piincc Kraft’ relates 
how tho 2nd Ccliclon ammunition column at Tliiancourt, on tho 
18th August, 1870, marchcd to tlic sound of tho guns and camc in 
time to snpply tho placc of thc cmpticd 1st Cchlon. Suck action 
should bc the rule, and not tho exception. Evcn should the empty 
1 “9th Lcttcr on Artillcry.” 
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carts yiii ~yngoiis from tlic front find tho colnnln and gct rcfilled, 
they miglit liare considei\llc difficulty in reaching tlicir rcspe‘ctiro 
units nsnin, unlcss commanded by nn Officcr. IVlicri n rcgimcnt of 
jnfantrj or cavalry encounters a few wngons coiiiinandcd by nn un- 
j l a p p ~  non-commissioned officcr, will it Ict thcm pass? No, i t  will 
them for a part of tlic train. . . . and will drivc thcm into 
tllc ditch.”’ O n  arrival of the scctions n t  tho front, thc “agents,” or 
tliosc in cliargc of tlic brigidc S.A.A. reservo or groups of battery 
wagons would soon sco thcm as thcy passed along thc rear of tho 
line. The carts or wagons could bc cschangcd, or 11avc their con- 
tkI1ts transferred according to thc emorgcncj of the case. Should no 
a t r a  ammunition lo required, tlic scctions of thc ammunition column 
could rcrnain as a rcscrvc till wanted. Their non-rcturn would be 
Lkcn by tbc couiiiander of tho column as a sign that no morc wcro 
reqnircd. Should thcy rctnrn with empties, thcy could rcfill arid 
again start for tho front if i t  W&S sccn that a frcsli fiupply was likely 
to bc rcqnircd. Oncc conncction is establislicd in this way tlio rest 
is cnsy, and tlic arumnuition columns could advnnco to any desired 
spot and their dicrcabouts bc mndo known to all conccimd. In the 
same way thc 2nd i.cliclon ammunition columns would draw ncar to  
the front as soon as news of .  battle camc, citlicr though their 
agents ” with thc 1st Cchclon columns, or otlicrwisc, and scctions of 
them might bc sent up to the columns in  front, to refill thcm if 
desired. 
P u p  Vork.--All rcd-tapc in  .tho wny of writleu rcquisitions and 
reccipts must bo doiic away with in  stress of bnttlc. With regard to 
this Princo Kraft remarks: “Wiicn a man is readily vcuturing his 
life from moment to xnomcnt at the call of honour and duty, l iothinh 
i t  hard to  bc rcqnircd to rendur an account of cspcndituro wlicn 
perhaps he may, within tho ncxt half hour, makc scttlcmcnt in full 
with his life’s blood, and men if a corps should rcnder a folsc rcturn 
to tho amount of 10,000 rounds, it, could bc donc withont detection 
mcrcly bj- showing 10,000 cstra cartridgcs cxpcndcd. But who 
would ever dream of embezzling cartridges in  time of war ? . . . . 
Tlicrcfore you must, whcn in thc ficld, givo up controlling your cx- 
penditurc of ammunition by doublc entry.” Hc then goes on to 
erplain that hc was taught by crpericnce that the dcmand for perio- 
dical ammunition returns only delayed tho issue witliout being any 
rcnl chcck on thc consumption. Thc only rcnl check possiblo or 
necessary, .in our opinion, is for tlic A.C. column to  tick off tho 
number of wagon-loads dclivcrcd to tho dirisional columns. h this 
would rcprescnt thc actual expcnditure in rcfilliiig pouclies and carts, 
it would really bo thc espcnditurc on tho battlefield by tho various 
divisions. Closer than this it secms unncccssnpx to go. As bearing 
an this, it may be mcntioncd that, after the + d i i m  Espcdition in 
1885, ncnrly all thc ordnnncc storo nccounts had to bc wiped off as 
“ Rcrue du Ccrcle JIilitnirr,” 2nd February, 1690, p. 91 ; 3150 Princc Prah’s 
“R.U.S.I. Journnl,” POI. sxis, p. 783. 
hopelcss. 
“ 9th Letter on Artillrrr.” 
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454 THE TACTICAL OPERATIOSS OF THE FUTURE. 
d d c a j i f a p s  cZnintcd /or  f h c  Sysfem-By tlic systcm cxplaincd 
above it is claimed that- 
(1.) The work is mole equnlized on the ficld of bnttlc, thoso in leap 
having their rtctivo dutics as wcll as those in front. 
(2.) Tho attention and dutics of awry combatant are concentrated 
on his front, and no combatant soldiers learc thcir regiments for the  
rear nnlcse wonndcd. 
-@.) Therc is greater rapidity in thc supply of rcscrrc ammu&. 
tion, and that.supply is moro certain. 
(4.) Empty carts and wagons returning to tlic rear clflcr having 
delivered a frcsh supply of ammunition to the combatants can do 80 
more leisurely if they know tho supply is nmplc for somo time, and 
thcy cnn, in such a casc, be made usc of to convcy wounded to the’ 
ficld hospitals, wliicli will naturally bc establishcd w a r  thc nmmuni- 
tion column. 
Conclusion.-Wc cannot do bcttcr than conclndc by quoting Prince 
Kmft’s summing up of the question of ammunition supply in tho 
future :I It will be doubtless necessary for ammunition col~rnns 
to detach wagons to diffcrcnt parts of thc fighting linc, and wc must 
makc up our minds to this. !hoops actually cxpgcd must makc a 
point of completing thcir ammunition a t  all times without waiting 
for ‘orders n-henevcr thcy get .z chanco of doing so, whilst the leaders 
of ammunition columns following out of fire must considcr it n sacred 
duty to mcct thc troops to wliieli t h y  arc attached 1idf way;and to 
furuisli them with supplies, and also wilhout ntcni t i~zg  orders, which 
the Gcneral might ncither have’ tho timo nor the mcans to send in tlic 
heat of battle.” 
* Ammunition suppl~-, under the present rcplations, sliows too 
much centralization to work moll in bnttlc. In this, as in othcr 
matters, dcccntraZizatio)t must bc thc ruling principle, and only by 
making thc pcrsonncl of nmmunition columns rcsponsiblc for the 
timcly supply of ammunition to troops in action, and for  alwap 
keeping full up the .wagons of thosc in fi-ont, can this principlc be 
cai-fied out in  its entirety. 
This ouglit to bc a p i n  to morals.  
“R.U.S.I. Journd,” rol. xriq p. isti. 
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